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Abstract 
My dissertation includes three papers. Paper one investigates 
preschoolers’ appreciation of how people become owners. In two experiments, 
70 3-to-5-year-olds were asked to explain why a character owns, likes, or uses 
certain objects. Four- and five-year-olds, but not three-year-olds, used past 
events of buying, giving and finding to explain ownership demonstrating an 
appreciation of how property is typically acquired. Four- and five-year-olds 
generated such explanations even though they never saw these past events 
happen. Thus, these findings also have implications for children’s ability to 
infer history in their explanations. Paper two examines children’s understanding 
of what ownership entitles owners to do with their property. In this study, 128 
children aged 4 to 6 were asked what a person was allowed to do with an object 
that belonged to the person, belonged to no-one, or belonged to someone else. 
Children were allowed to provide as many responses as they wished. Their 
responses reflected an appreciation that ownership affects a wide range of 
object uses including harmless object use. The pattern of children’s responses 
also suggested that they view ownership as restricting non-owners from using 
property, rather than affecting use by entitling owners. Paper three investigates 
the influence of ownership on young children’s reasoning by examining when 
preschoolers use ownership to explain acceptability. In this study, 323 3- to 5-
year-olds were asked to explain acceptable and unacceptable actions. In 
Experiments 1 and 2, ownership was not mentioned to children before they 
generated their explanations. In these experiments, older preschoolers but not 
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younger preschoolers spontaneously referenced ownership more than 
alternative considerations in their explanations. In Experiment 3, ownership 
was mentioned to children before they generated their explanations. In this 
experiment, younger preschoolers frequently referenced ownership when 
explaining unacceptability, but not when explaining acceptability. Together 
these findings suggest that ownership is influential in preschoolers’ reasoning 
about the acceptability of using objects, but that the scope of its influence 
increases with age. My dissertation concludes with a discussion of the broader 
implications of my findings for children’s reasoning about ownership.
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Chapter One: General Introduction 
Consider the objects people come into contact with each day: the rows 
of cars in parking lots, the stacks of books in libraries, and the abundance of 
flowers in gardens. Whether and how objects are interacted with often depends 
on ownership. For instance, although people may freely pick their own flowers, 
they may not pick others’ flowers without consent. In this way, ownership has a 
significant impact on our daily lives. 
However, ownership has not been a prominent topic of study in 
developmental psychology. Beyond its importance to daily life, there are two 
reasons why developmental psychologists should care about ownership.  
First, ownership greatly influences young children’s thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviors. The presence of personal property predicts toddlers’ willingness 
to explore new environments (Passman, 1977). Discussing who owns an object, 
rather than other facts like its name, makes preschoolers more likely to track it 
through space (Gelman, Noles & Stilwell, 2014). Knowing who owns an object 
affects how much preschoolers like it, how much they think it is worth, and 
how likely they are to remember it (even if the ownership is very new) 
(Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae & Turk, 2013; Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 
2012; Grisdale, Lind, Eacott, & Williams, 2014; Irwin, & Gebhard, 1946). 
Ownership even predicts the emergence of important behaviors: Infants’ 
recognition of who owns familiar objects is correlated with how quickly and 
how often they engage in prosocial behaviors like sharing (Brownell, Iesue, 
Nichols, & Svetlova, 2012; Hay, 2006), and their success on object permanence 
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tasks (Rodgon, & Rashman, 1976). As such, the study of ownership is 
important for understanding these factors. 
Second, the study of ownership offers insight into how children reason 
about and represent abstract concepts—a topic of major interest to 
developmental psychologists (e.g., Carey, 2009; Gelman, 2003; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994). Ownership is an abstract concept because it is not perceivable 
or directly observable (i.e., there are no identifiable or physical properties of an 
object that make it belong to someone). The thought processes implicated in 
children’s reasoning about ownership likely also underlie their reasoning about 
other abstract concepts. For example, recent evidence suggests that making 
inferences about the past or history is important for children’s reasoning about a 
host of abstract concepts (i.e., language, authenticity, contamination, mental 
states) including ownership (Cimpian & Cadena, 2010; Cimpian & Markman, 
2009; Frazier & Gelman, 2009; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Kremer, 1991; 
Russell, 1990; Schulz, Bonawitz & Griffiths, 2007; Weatherhead, White & 
Friedman, in press; for ownership see Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, 
Defeyeter, & Neary, 2013; Gelman, Manczak, Was, & Noles, in press). 
Examining children’s reasoning about ownership is particularly useful for 
understanding such processes because it is a domain about which young 
children readily and successfully reason (for a review see Nancekivell, Van de 
Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013).  
What do young children know about ownership?   
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Most previous studies examining children’s understanding of ownership 
have relied on similar methodology. They typically presented children with a 
vignette about characters or real people who interacted with objects in some 
way, and then asked children questions about the ownership of the object, such 
as “who does it belong to?” and “whose is it?”. These studies often also 
included control conditions where children were shown the same vignettes but 
asked instead about preferences (e.g., “who likes it?”).  These control 
conditions typically ruled out lower-level explanations for findings. Instead of 
asking children direct questions, a subset of studies recorded children’s 
reactions to the vignette (e.g., comments or protests). Previous work has chiefly 
considered two questions about children’s understanding of ownership. 
Assigning Ownership  
The first question is how children assign ownership to other people. 
Previous studies show that children use a variety of strategies to assign 
ownership and the number strategies they use increases with age. Two-year-
olds assign ownership to the first person who uses the object (Friedman & 
Neary, 2008), and to the person who they are told owns it (e.g., “It’s Sally’s 
ball”) (Blake, Ganea, & Harris, 2012). Three-year-olds use gender and age 
stereotypes when assigning ownership; they judge that a doll belongs to a girl 
and that a car belongs to an adult (Malcom, Defeyter, & Friedman, 2014). They 
consider creative labour and assign ownership to whoever creatively modifies 
an object (Kangiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010; Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; 
Kanngiesser, Itakura, & Hood, 2014).  They use spatio-temporal history to 
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determine who owns perceptually identical objects (Gelman, Manczak, & 
Noles, 2012). For example, they consider the previous location of an object 
when deciding who owns it. Older 3-year-olds recognize that whoever controls 
access to an object is likely its owner (Neary, Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). 
Four-year-olds use changes in emotional state to assign ownership. For 
instance, they judge that a sad child likely owns a broken toy (Pesowski, & 
Friedman, under review). They also recognize that artifacts typically have 
owners and natural kinds do not (Neary, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 
2012; Van de Vandervoort, & Friedman, 2015). Older 5-year-olds recognize 
that purchasing an object from a store, or receiving it as a gift entitles someone 
to own it (Blake & Harris, 2009; Cram & Ng, 1989; Furby, 1978) and that 
stealing does not entitle ownership (Blake & Harris, 2009). Finally, 6-year-old 
children use almost all of the aforementioned strategies to determine who owns 
an idea (Li, Shaw & Olson, 2013; Shaw, & Olson, 2012; Yang, Shaw, Garduno, 
& Olson, 2014) and 9-year-olds use many of these strategies to judge who owns 
land (e.g., an island) (Verkuyten, Sierksma, & Tijs, 2015). 
Ownership and Normative Reasoning 
The second question research has examined is how children represent 
and uphold the norms of ownership. Ownership governs how and whether 
objects may be used. For example, although I can drive my own car, I would 
most likely get arrested if I drove someone else’s car without consent. From a 
young age, children appreciate this normative dimension of ownership. Four-
year-olds recognize that an owner’s permission affects whether property may be 
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used (Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2015), and that owners are entitled to 
control the use of even newly acquired property (Kim & Kalish, 2009). Three to 
five-year-olds are more likely to share toys belonging to the entire class than 
their own toys, suggesting that they know that classmates are entitled to play 
with the classroom’s toys but not their toys (Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, & Bartlett, 
1981; Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, Hand & Sadalla, 1979). Five-year-olds recognize 
that ownership also governs normative behavior surrounding the use of ideas 
and express dislike for those who copy others’ ideas (Olson & Shaw, 2011). 
Children also enforce these ownership norms. Toddlers claim their 
property by verbally declaring “mine” and acknowledge others’ property by 
labelling things as “yours” (Hay, 2006; Ross, 1996; Ross, 2013; Ross, 
Friedman & Field, 2015). Two-year-olds protest when their property is used 
without consent, and three-year-olds protest when others’ property is used 
without consent (Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, & Bartlett, 1981; Kanngiesser, & 
Hood, 2014; Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). Three-year-olds also 
protest when someone interferes with an owner’s wishes (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2013). For example, three-year-olds protested a puppet who tried to 
prevent an owner from sharing her toy.  
Preschoolers’ reasoning about what owners should be allowed to do 
with their property differs from adults’ reasoning in a few ways. Four- and five-
year-olds may not think that owners are entitled to modify their property, or use 
it atypically (Kim & Kalish, 2009). They are also more likely than adults to side 
with owners in conflicts over property (Neary & Friedman, 2014). For example, 
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4-year-olds, but not adults, judge that owners should get to use their property 
even if someone else needs it to accomplish a goal (e.g., finish making a 
birthday card). Together, existing research demonstrates that very young 
children know a lot about ownership and that what they know continues to 
develop into adulthood.  
My Dissertation 
 My dissertation examines young children’s ownership reasoning and is 
divided into three papers. All three of my papers utilize open-ended measures. 
In my first and third paper I examine children’s explanations, and in my second 
paper I examine children’s lists of object uses or affordances. The importance 
of such measures has not always been recognized in developmental psychology. 
Research using open-ended measures was often criticized as being too 
linguistically demanding and as a result underestimating children’s true abilities 
(Wellman, 2011). Because of these criticisms open-ended measures decreased 
in popularity (Wellman, 2011). However, recently there has been a resurgence 
in the use of open-ended measures to study developmental psychology. This is 
in part because open-ended measures can offer important insights into young 
children’s conceptual representations that other measure may not (Carey, 1985; 
Wellman, 2011). Studies analyzing children’s explanations have revealed that 
preschoolers have causal knowledge of outcomes which was previously 
unknown (Bartsch, & Wellman, 1989; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009). For 
example, explanations, unlike predictions, revealed that young preschoolers 
understand that contamination causes illness (Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 
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2009). Likewise, open-ended investigations involving children’s listing of 
questions has offered insight into how the structure of children’s knowledge 
differs by domain (Greif, Nelson, Keil, & Gutierrez, 2006; Kemler Nelson, 
Holt, & Egan, 2004). For instance, one study examining 3- to 5-year-olds’ lists 
of questions about artifacts and animals revealed that children view function as 
central to artifacts, but biological processes as central to animals (Greif et al., 
2006). Similarly, I employ open-ended measures in my studies because of their 
benefits for the study of conceptual development.  
 My procedures also include minimal information. The procedure used in 
my papers is always as follows: Children are shown a picture, told one fact 
about it, and then asked an open-ended question. They thus must generate their 
responses solely based upon this fact. For example, in my first study, children 
are shown a picture of a boy and object, told it was his, and then simply asked 
to explain “why.” By designing my experiments in this way, I am able to study 
children’s ability to reason about ownership naturally without much support. 
In my papers, I examine children aged 3 to 6 because these are the first 
ages at which children reliably produce explanations and thus are likely to 
produce interpretable responses to open-ended measures (Wellman, 2011). It is 
also the age at which they begin to show respect of others’ ownership (for a 
review see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013).  
Major Questions 
Each paper composes one chapter of my dissertation and explores a 
separate question about young children’s reasoning about ownership.  
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 Paper one investigates the “how” of ownership—it investigates whether 
preschoolers recognize how people become owners. Specific causal 
mechanisms underlie the legal acquisition of objects. Property is normally 
bought, given, made, or found. Particular kinds of objects are typically acquired 
in particular ways (e.g., manufactured objects are usually bought, natural 
objects are usually found, and art is usually made). Without an appreciation for 
how property is acquired, people would not know how to acquire it for 
themselves. For example, someone could believe it is equally possible to 
acquire a new couch by purchasing it or doing a dance in front of it. In two 
experiments, I explore whether preschoolers recognize how objects are 
acquired. I do this by asking 3- to 5-year-olds to explain why a character owns 
an object and then examining their explanations. To successfully answer this 
question children must infer what event might lead the character to own the 
object (i.e., make inferences about unseen past events). Such inferences reflect a 
powerful process that allows individuals to infer previous events that they did 
not witness themselves. This same process might allow a detective to 
reconstruct a crime scene and an archeologist to infer how people in an ancient 
culture lived. This study is also one of the first to investigate preschoolers’ 
ability to make inferences about the unseen past or history in their explanations 
and is framed as such. 
Paper two investigates the “what” of ownership—it investigates 
preschoolers’ reasoning about what ownership entitles owners to do with their 
property. People may use their own objects as well as unowned objects in a 
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multitude of ways, but they cannot use others’ objects in these ways, even 
harmlessly. For example, someone may decorate their own trees and wild trees, 
but may not decorate their neighbors’ trees, even though doing so is harmless 
and likely would not affect the neighbors or the trees. In two experiments, I 
explore whether children recognize how ownership affects object use. I do this 
by asking 4- to 6-year-olds to list what a character is allowed to do with either 
an object they own or an object they do not own. Children’s lists are examined 
to determine how the ownership of an object affects the permissibility of 
different kinds of actions. Ownership might affect permissibility of actions in 
two ways. It might entitle owners with special rights, or act mainly on non-
owners and restrict them from using others’ property. Children’s lists are also 
examined to determine which of these accounts better explains their reasoning. 
 Paper three investigates the “when” of ownership—it investigates when 
and how ownership influences preschoolers’ reasoning about acceptability. 
Suppose while playing outside a child notices their neighbor has a new bike, 
and despite really liking it, the child decides not to ride it. This child may make 
this decision for several reasons besides ownership: the bike could be too large 
to ride, the child might fear her parents’ punishment, or she may not want to 
make her neighbor sad. However, adults consider these other factors secondary 
to ownership (i.e., they view ownership as a better reason for not riding the 
bike). It is unknown if young children reason in this way. Considering 
ownership in such cases may be very difficult for young children. Ownership is 
far less obvious than other factors such as the bike’s size. Although previous 
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research has demonstrated that young children are capable of considering 
ownership when reasoning about the acceptability of using objects (for a review 
see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013), they have not 
demonstrated that preschoolers spontaneously consider ownership when 
reasoning about acceptability, or that they might view it as more important than 
other factors. In three experiments I explore the influence of ownership on 
preschoolers’ reasoning about the acceptability of using objects.  
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Chapter Two: Preschoolers’ reasoning about how ownership is 
acquired (Paper One) 
 
This paper was previously published: 
Nancekivell, S. E., & Friedman, O. (2014). Preschoolers selectively infer 
history when explaining outcomes: Evidence from explanations of 
ownership, liking, and use. Child Development, 85, 1236-1247. doi: 
10.1111/cdev.12170  
 
Copyright © 2013 Society for Research in Child Development Inc., 
Reproduced with permission. 
 
 
Introduction 
Why are seashells sometimes found on top of mountains? Why do 
Americans drive on the right side of the road? Why does Stonehenge exist? 
These questions cannot be answered by only considering present facts. For 
instance, knowing that Stonehenge is a popular tourist destination, or that it is 
close to the town of Amesbury, will not help you explain why it exists. To 
answer this question, you must make inferences about the past. For example, 
you might try to infer what Stonehenge was originally used for. 
The ability to infer history when producing explanations may be 
particularly important in childhood. Producing explanations allows children to 
understand unexpected outcomes, learn about nonobvious causal properties, and 
test their hypotheses about the world by guiding their exploration (Keil, 2006; 
Legare, 2012; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004). Inferring history in explanations 
may broaden the scenarios where children can learn—it may allow children to 
produce explanations for an outcome, even when they did not witness the prior 
circumstances that caused it. 
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Children’s Explanations 
Children begin producing explanations at age two (Hickling & 
Wellman, 2001) and by age four produce causal explanations about a wide 
variety of topics, including contamination, illness, supernatural phenomena, 
motion, and theory of mind (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Gelman & 
Gottfried,1996; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Rosengren & 
Hickling, 1994). These explanations often refer to nonobvious causal properties 
and entities. For example, 3-year-olds use unobservable mental states (e.g., 
beliefs, desires) to explain people's actions, and 4-year-olds use magic to 
explain why an object suddenly changed color (Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; 
Rosengren & Hickling, 1994). 
Little is known about children's ability to infer history in their 
explanations. Most studies examining children's explanations include a vignette 
or story, which provides any information about the past that children may need 
in their responses (Legare et al., 2009; Rosengren & Hickling,1994; Schulz, 
Bonawitz, & Griffiths, 2007). For example, in one experiment, children were 
told a story about a boy who became sick after he ate a candy licked by a dog 
(Legare et al., 2009). When asked to explain why the boy got sick, children 
provided explanations such as, “Dog took a lick, they spread germs on each 
other and the boy gets sick” (Legare et al., 2009). In providing such 
explanations, children inferred the transfer of germs, an event that was not 
explicitly mentioned. However, because this germ transfer happened when the 
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dog licked the candy, the children did not have to infer a past event, only an 
event that occurred during the story (Legare et al., 2009). 
In other studies, children chose between two explanations that used past 
events to explain an outcome (Schulz et al., 2007; Woolley, Cornelius, & 
Lacy, 2011). For instance, children were told that Bambi had itchy spots and 
were then asked whether this was “because of running through the garden or 
because of running through the cattail?” (Schulz et al., 2007). Because children 
in these studies were told the relevant history, these findings do not demonstrate 
that they infer history in their explanations. 
To our knowledge only four previous studies provide evidence that 
children may infer history in their explanations. In two of these studies, 
preschoolers were asked to explain the origins of natural kinds and artifacts, as 
well as their features (Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Kremer,1991). For example, 
preschoolers were asked, “Why do rabbits hop and have long ears?” Although 
some preschoolers inferred history in their explanations (e.g., “The egg made 
the ears so that it had them when it hatched”), such responses often followed 
prompts that encouraged discussion of the past (e.g., “Did a person make the 
long ears?”). In addition, because children's ability to infer history was not a 
variable of interest, its frequency was not reported. In the other two studies, 
children were told the features of animals and artifacts, and were then asked to 
explain why they have these features (Cimpian & Cadena, 2010; Cimpian & 
Markman, 2009). Children often inferred history in their explanations when 
explaining the existence of these features, though again such responses were not 
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the variable of interest. For example, when asked to explain why a particular 
tree has tubes inside it, one child said “maybe because there's a hole under it, 
and someone sticked a tube inside” (Cimpian & Markman, 2009). These 
findings suggest that children try to infer history in their explanations; however, 
the reported explanations were varied and often appeared implausible. Hence, it 
remains unclear whether children's historical inferences are constrained by their 
causal knowledge and whether these inferences allow children to infer historical 
events that are plausible. 
Explanations and Ownership 
If children have the ability to infer history in their explanations, they 
may be most likely to use this ability when explaining outcomes that causally 
depend on historical events. One area where children might be especially likely 
to infer history is in their explanations of why a person owns an object. This is 
plausible because current ownership depends on past events. For example, a 
person's current ownership of a bicycle depends on the person having 
previously purchased it. Hence, to explain why a person currently owns an 
object, children might refer to the past event that caused (or plausibly caused) 
the person to own it, even if they did not witness this event. Furthermore, 
children's explanations about ownership are likely to be accurate because there 
are only a few kinds of events that can cause ownership of an object—objects 
become owned when they are found, made, purchased, or received as gifts. 
Hence, children may not need much causal knowledge to accurately infer 
history when explaining ownership. 
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Children demonstrate significant knowledge about ownership at young 
ages. From early on, preschoolers appreciate ownership rights (Eisenberg-Berg, 
Haake, & Bartlett, 1981; Eisenberg-Berg, Haake, Hand, & Sadalla, 1979; 
Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). At age two, preschoolers protest when 
their own property is thrown away, and at age three they object when other's 
rights are infringed upon (Rossano et al., 2011). Moreover, 4- and 5-year-olds 
understand that owners can use their property in ways that others cannot; 
however, unlike adults, 4- and 5-year-olds believe that there are some 
restrictions on how owners can use their property (Kim & Kalish, 2009). In 
addition, preschoolers can judge who owns an object in a variety of 
circumstances. Two-year-olds can identify who owns familiar objects (e.g., 
their toothbrush or their mother's shoes), and sometimes view the first person 
seen with an object as the owner (Fasig, 2000; Friedman, 2008; Friedman & 
Neary, 2008). By age three, preschoolers understand that ownership of an 
object endures regardless of the spatiotemporal location of an object (Gelman, 
Manczak, & Noles, 2012). Furthermore at this age, preschoolers can use a 
character's control over the use an object to help decide who owns it (Neary, 
Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009). It is also at the age of three that preschoolers 
understand some of the ways in which ownership can be transferred (Blake & 
Harris, 2009; Friedman & Neary, 2008; Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010). 
Preschoolers understand that ownership of an object can be transferred to the 
person who creatively modifies it (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). They also view the 
transfer of a wrapped gift between two characters as gift giving but do not 
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consider the transfer of an unwrapped gift this way (Blake & Harris, 2009; 
Friedman & Neary, 2008). 
Two previous findings suggest that preschoolers may consider object 
history when reasoning about ownership. First, 3-year-olds use spatiotemporal 
history to judge who owns a toy (Gelman et al., 2012). Gelman et al. (2012) 
showed children three identical objects and told them that one object belongs to 
them and another to the experimenter. Even after the toys were moved around 
the table, the preschoolers were able to identify their toy and that of the 
experimenter. However, these findings do not reveal whether 
preschoolers infer past events when making ownership judgments. Second, 
preschoolers may use object origins to judge whether objects are owned (Neary, 
Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2012). Neary et al. (2012) asked 
preschoolers to judge whether or not artifacts and natural kinds were owned. 
Preschoolers viewed the natural kinds as less likely to be owned than artifacts. 
This difference may have occurred because preschoolers appreciate that 
artifacts are made by people and are therefore likely to be owned, while natural 
kinds are not made by people and are therefore unlikely to be owned (Neary 
et al., 2012). However, non-historical reasoning might instead underlie their 
judgments. Instead, preschoolers might have based their ownership judgments 
on non-historical rules, such as “toys are owned” and “plants are not owned” 
(Neary et al., 2012). Previous findings do not provide conclusive evidence that 
children infer history when reasoning about ownership. 
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The Present Studies 
The present studies investigate children's historical inferences by 
examining their explanations of ownership. We expect that children will infer 
history when explaining why a person owns an object, because this depends on 
past events. In particular, children should discuss how the object came to be 
owned (e.g., being found, made, or bought). However, children should not infer 
history, or refer to specific events of acquisition, to explain outcomes for which 
these are not causally relevant. For example, to explain why a woman likes a 
bicycle, children should not refer to her having bought it, because this is not 
causally relevant to her liking it. Instead, children might refer to its 
characteristics (e.g., the bike is fast) or the woman's taste in bicycles (she likes 
red bicycles). Similarly, to explain why she is riding a bicycle, children might 
refer to her current goals or aims (e.g., she wants to go to a friend's house). 
Again, past events should not be relevant. 
We also examine whether children's history-based explanations are 
sensitive to likelihood. For example, a number of events could explain why the 
woman owns the bike—she might have made it herself, she might have found it 
abandoned in a forest, or she could have bought it. Even so, it is most likely that 
the woman's ownership depends on having bought the bicycle. Conversely, if 
the woman owns a rock, it would be more plausible that she found it. If 
preschoolers consider likelihood, their explanations of ownership should 
change depending on which object is being discussed, and they should be more 
likely to infer past events that actually occurred. 
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These predictions were examined in two experiments. Experiment 1 
compared children's explanations of ownership with their explanations of 
liking; Experiment 2 compared children's explanations of ownership with their 
explanations of object use. 
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. Sixty-seven children were tested. These included thirty-
three 3-year-olds (M = 3 years 5 months; range = 3,0–3,11; 12 girls) and thirty-
six 4-year-olds (M = 4,5; range = 4,0–4,11; 17 girls). An additional sixteen 3-
year-olds and six 4-year-olds were also tested but excluded from analysis 
because they failed a screening task (described below). Although demographics 
were not formally collected, the majority of these children were from White 
middle-class families. 
Materials and Procedures. Testing began with a screening task. 
Children were shown a picture of children playing in a park, and were asked six 
questions about the scene, as follows: “What is this boy doing?” “Can you find 
a girl on a bike?” “What color is her bike?” “Why is this girl holding balloons?” 
“Why are all the children playing?” and “What color is this girl's shirt?” This 
task was included to ensure that participants could produce explanations in 
response to the experimenter's questions. Children passed the screening task if 
they produced explanations for both why questions. The quality of their 
explanations was not evaluated. When children did not produce an explanation, 
or said, “I don't know,” they were prompted twice. First, they were requested to 
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“just guess,” and then if they still did not produce an explanation, the original 
“why” question was repeated. If an explanation was still not produced, the 
experimenter moved on to the next trial. This prompting procedure was also 
used in the main task. 
Once the screening task was complete, children in each age group were 
randomly assigned to either of two conditions, “ownership” or “liking.” The 
ownership condition consisted of three test trials. In each trial, children were 
shown a picture displayed on a laptop using PowerPoint. Each picture depicted 
a character and an object (boy with a rock, girl with a picture, girl with a hat; 
see Figure 1 for a sample picture). The character was shown beside the object, 
but not holding or touching it. In each trial, the experimenter briefly introduced 
the picture (e.g., “Here is a boy, and here is a rock”), and then told children that 
the character owns the object (e.g., “It is the boy's rock”). They were then asked 
a comprehension question to ensure that they understood who owned the object 
(e.g., “Whose rock is it?”). After correctly answering the comprehension 
question, children were asked to explain why the character owns the object 
(e.g., “Why is it the boy's rock?”). 
 
Figure 1. Experiment 1: Example of stimuli used during test trials. 
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Each child was assigned to receive the three test trials in one of six 
different orders. To prevent children from repeating their answers across trials, 
distractor tasks were given between the test trials. In the first distractor task, 
children looked at an image of penguins and were asked, “What are the 
penguins doing?” and “Are they having fun?” In the second distractor task, 
children were shown an image of three cars and were asked, “Which car will 
win?” and “Is it the fastest?” 
The liking condition followed the same procedure, but with three 
exceptions. First, rather than being told that the character in each trial owns the 
object, children were told that the character likes the object (e.g., “The boy likes 
the rock”). Second, the comprehension question asked who likes the object 
(e.g., “Who likes the rock?”). And third, children were asked to explain why the 
character likes the object (e.g., “Why does the boy like the rock?”). 
Occasionally, children had difficulty producing the correct answer to the 
comprehension question. If the children indicated someone other than the 
character in the picture (e.g., “Me!”) their answer was carried forward into the 
main test question (e.g., “Why do you like the rock?” or “Why is it your 
rock?”). However, such alternative responses occurred very infrequently. 
Transcription and Coding. All testing sessions were audio recorded 
onto a laptop and then transcribed by a research assistant. Before coding began, 
children's answers to the why questions were separated from the rest of the 
transcript. The answers were then randomly sorted, so that they could no longer 
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be associated with their condition. Next, children's answers were coded. First, 
each response was coded as informative or uninformative. Responses were 
considered uninformative if the child produced an answer that was completely 
unrelated to the task (e.g., “Cats” or “I really like red hats”) or if the child 
indicated they did not know the answer (e.g., “I don't know” or “I can't think of 
anything”). All other responses were considered informative. Informative 
responses were then coded into one or more of the following categories: 
Characteristics, use/desire, proximity, history, and acquisition. Responses in 
the characteristics category described features of the object (e.g., “It is red” or 
“It's fun”). Explanations in the use/desire category described how the character 
might use the object (“She wears it”), the character's preference for the object 
(e.g., “He likes it”), or the character's desire for the object (e.g., “He wants it”). 
Use, preferences, and desires were grouped as one category because children 
often used or mentioned them concurrently, making them difficult to isolate 
(e.g., “He likes to play with the ball”). Explanations in the proximity category 
referenced the distance between the character and the object (e.g., “It is near 
him” or “It is beside him”). Explanations in the history category referenced the 
past (e.g., “He had it” or “He was playing with it”). Explanations in 
the acquisition category described how the character became the owner of the 
object (e.g., “He bought the hat”). Explanations in the acquisition category were 
further coded by the type of acquisition: made, found, bought, gave, and other. 
Explanations found in other referred to nonspecific ways of acquiring objects 
(e.g., “He got it”). 
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Two coders coded all explanations independently. The intercoder 
reliability reached near perfect levels with Cohen's Kappas ranging from 0.83 to 
1.0. All disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results and Discussion 
Each child had the opportunity to produce three explanations (i.e., one 
explanation in each of the three trials). However, children sometimes gave non-
informative responses (e.g., they remained silent, or said, “I don't know”). 
These responses were included in the analysis but were coded as 0 for all 
categories. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to examine whether children's 
inferences of history, and their references to acquisition principles, differed by 
age. A first analysis of variance (ANOVA) examined the effects of age (3 vs. 4) 
and condition (ownership vs. liking) on children's inferences about history. It 
revealed a main of effect of age, F(1, 65) = 14.40, p < .001, η2p = .19; a main 
effect of condition, F(1, 65) = 9.88,p < .001, η2p = .18; and an Age × Condition 
interaction, F(1, 65) = 17.61, p < .001, η2p = .21. A second ANOVA examined 
whether children's references to acquisition were influenced by age (3 vs. 4) 
and condition (ownership vs. liking). It also revealed a main effect of age, F(1, 
65) = 20.91, p < .001, η2p = .29; a main effect of condition, F(1, 
65) = 22.25, p < .001, η2p = .26; and a significant Age × Condition interaction 
F(1, 65) = 13.32, p = .001, η2p = .17. Because of these effects of age, findings 
from 3- and 4-year-olds were examined separately in all subsequent analyses. 
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The main analysis examined whether explanation scores in each 
category differed between the ownership and liking conditions. If children 
understand that past events are more causally relevant for ownership, then they 
should refer to history more when explaining ownership than when explaining 
liking. Specifically, they should refer to acquisition more in their explanations 
of ownership than in their explanations of liking, because how an object can 
come to be owned is only causally relevant for liking. 
Figure 2 compares 3- and 4-year-olds' mean scores for each scored 
category, in the ownership and liking conditions. For each scored category, 
independent samples t tests were conducted to compare scores between the 
ownership and liking conditions. Three-year-olds' explanations did not vary by 
condition for any of the coded categories, t(31)history = 0.44, p = 
.662; t(31)acquisition = −1.11, p = .277;t(31)use/desire = 0.60, p = .554; t(31)characteristic
s = 0.94, p = .356, t(31)proximity = −1.03, p = .310. Four-year-olds' explanations 
were markedly different and varied greatly across conditions. Four-year-olds 
used history and acquisition of the object more to explain ownership than 
liking, t(34)history = −4.81, p < .001, η2 = .40; t(34)acquisition = −4.93, p < .001, 
η2 = .42. Characteristics of the object were mentioned more often in 
explanations of liking than ownership, t(34) = 2.80, p = .008, η2 = .19. The 
use/desire category, however, did not vary by condition, t(34) = 1.67, p = .104, 
and 4-year-olds' use of proximity was not analyzed as it was not used in either 
condition. Four-year-olds' greater use of history and acquisition in the 
ownership condition demonstrates that they are more likely to infer history 
 24 
 
when explaining outcomes that depend on past events. This conclusion does not 
apply to 3-year-olds as their responses did not differ across the conditions. 
Figure 2. Experiment 1: The proportion of 3- and 4-year-olds' responses falling 
into each coded category in the liking and ownership conditions. 
 
We then examined whether 4-year-olds' explanations were sensitive to 
likelihood. Each object in the tasks had a different kind-typical way of 
becoming owned: Simple pictures are typically made, rocks are typically found, 
and hats are typically bought. Hence, this analysis examined 4-year-olds' use 
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of made, found, and bought to explain ownership. We initially expected that 
children might also use the principle given, particularly to explain ownership of 
the hat. However, this principle was only used by one participant, so its use was 
not analyzed. 
Made was used more to explain ownership of the picture than ownership of the 
rock or hat, Fisher's exact test, p < .001, and in the picture trial, made was used 
more to explain ownership than liking, Fisher's exact tests, p = .007. Found was 
used more to explain ownership of the rock than of the picture or hat, Fisher's 
exact test, p < .001, and in the rock trial, found was used more to explain 
ownership than liking, Fisher's exact tests, p = .027. Bought was used more to 
explain ownership of the hat than of the rock or picture, Fisher's exact 
test, p = .002, and in the hat trial, bought was used more to explain ownership 
than liking, Fisher's exact test, p = .019. Figure 3 illustrates this pattern and 
shows preschoolers responses by object. These findings show that 4-year-olds' 
explanations reflect an appreciation of the likelihood of events that can cause 
ownership. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1: The proportion of 4-year-olds' responses in which 
ownership of each object was explained as resulting from making, finding, or 
buying. 
 
In sum, these findings show that 4-year-olds understand that current 
ownership of an object depends on past events, particularly acquisition events, 
whereas preference for an object does not. Furthermore, their explanations are 
sensitive to likelihood. Taken together, the findings reveal that children's 
explanations are constrained by their causal knowledge (i.e., knowledge of how 
ownership is acquired) and that 4-year-olds are able to infer events that 
plausibly happened. 
We suggest that children's explanations of ownership and liking differed 
because children understand that past events are causally relevant for 
ownership, but not liking. However, ownership and liking differ in many ways, 
and so other factors may account for the differences found. For example, 
whereas owners typically interact physically with their property, this may be 
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less characteristic of liking (e.g., you can like a painting without ever coming 
close to it). Thus, children may have referred to making, finding, and buying 
because they are common physical interactions with the objects presented, and 
not because they cause ownership. 
To rule out this possibility, preschoolers in a second experiment were 
asked to explain why a character is using an object. Even more than ownership, 
object use requires physical interaction with an object. Hence, if non-causal 
reasoning were responsible for the findings in Experiment 1, then children 
should give similar explanations for ownership and use. However, if their 
explanations depend on causal knowledge, children should refer to past 
acquisition events more when explaining ownership than object use. Because 3-
year-olds did not infer history in their explanations, they were not included in 
this experiment. To further explore developmental differences, 5-year-olds were 
tested in addition to 4-year-olds. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Seventy children were tested, including thirty-four 4-year-
olds (M = 4,7; range = 4,0–4,11; 15 girls) and thirty-six 5-year-olds (M = 5,4; 
range = 5,0–5,11; 16 girls). An additional six 4-year-olds and two 5-year-olds 
were also tested but were not included in analysis because they failed a 
screening task. 
Materials and Procedures. Children first engaged in the same 
screening task used in Experiment 1. Children in each age group were randomly 
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assigned to either of two conditions, “ownership” or “use.” The ownership 
condition consisted of two test trials. In each trial, children were shown a 
picture displayed on a laptop using PowerPoint. In one trial, the picture showed 
a boy holding a rock; in the other, it showed a girl holding a drawing 
(presentation order of the trials was counterbalanced across children). In each 
trial, the experimenter briefly introduced the picture (e.g., “Here is a boy, and 
here is a rock”) and then told children that the character owns the object (e.g., 
“It is the boy's rock”). They were then asked a comprehension question to 
ensure they understood who owned the object (e.g., “Whose rock is it?”); 
children occasionally had difficulty with this question, and these instances were 
treated the same as in Experiment 1. After children correctly answered the 
comprehension question, they were asked to explain why the character owns the 
object (e.g., “Why is it the boy's rock?”). To prevent the repetition of answers, 
the penguin distracter task from Experiment 1 was used between the two trials. 
The procedure in the use condition was identical except children were 
told that the character is using the object. In the picture trial they were told, 
“The girl is looking at the picture,” and in the rock trial were told, “The boy is 
playing with the rock.” The main test question was also modified to ask to 
children to explain why the character is using the object (e.g., “Why is the girl 
looking at the picture?”). 
Similar to Experiment 1, children occasionally had difficulty producing 
the correct answer to the comprehension question. This was dealt with in the 
same manner as in Experiment 1. 
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Transcription and Coding. Transcription and coding procedures were 
identical to those in Experiment 1, with one exception. Because the characters 
were depicted holding the objects, the proximity category was expanded to 
include this fact. For example, if a child said, “Because he's holding it,” this 
was coded as a proximity response. As in Experiment 1, all explanations were 
coded independently by two coders. The inter-coder reliability was at near-
perfect levels with Cohen's Kappas ranged from 0.82 to 1.0. All disagreements 
were resolved by discussion. 
Results and Discussion 
Each child had the opportunity to produce two explanations (i.e., one 
explanation in each of the two trials). Although children sometimes gave non-
informative responses (e.g., they remained silent, or said, “I don't know”), these 
responses were included in the analysis but were coded as 0 for all categories. 
Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of age on children's inferences 
of history or on their references to acquisition principles. Because there were no 
effects of age, findings from 4- and 5-year-olds were examined together in all 
subsequent analyses. The main analysis examined whether explanation scores 
in each category differed between the ownership and use conditions. If children 
understand that ownership depends on past events then they should refer to 
history more when explaining ownership than object use. Furthermore, children 
should use acquisition less often when explaining object use because how an 
object was acquired is not causally relevant.  
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Figure 4 shows 4- and 5-year-olds' mean scores for each scored category 
in the ownership and use conditions. For each category, independent samples t 
tests were conducted to compare scores between the ownership and use 
conditions. Children used history of the object to explain ownership but rarely 
to explain object use, t(68) = −1.10, p < .001, η2 = .02. Children always 
referred to acquisition when referring to history, and so analysis of acquisition 
yielded the same values, t(68) = −1.10, p < .001, η2 = .02. This was not true in 
Experiment 1 because the 4-year-olds, in that experiment occasionally spoke 
about history without discussing object acquisition. References to object 
use/desire occurred more in explanations of use than ownership, t(68) = 5.22, p 
< .001, η2 = .29. References to proximity and characteristics did not vary by 
condition, t(68)proximity = −1.19,  p = .240; t(68)characteristics = .431, p = .668. 
Figure 4. Experiment 2: The proportion of 4- and 5-year-olds' responses falling 
into each coded category in the using and ownership conditions. 
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Further analyses examined whether 4- and 5-year-olds' causal inferences 
varied for the rock and the picture (i.e., simple pictures are typically made and 
rocks are typically found). This analysis examined 4-year-olds' use 
of made and found. Made was used more to explain ownership of the picture 
than ownership of the rock, Fisher's exact test, p < .001, and in the picture 
trial, made was used more to explain ownership than liking, Fisher's exact 
test, p < .001. Found was used more to explain ownership of the rock than of 
the picture, Fisher's exact test, p < .001, and in the rock trial, found was used 
more to explain ownership than liking, p < .001. Figure 5 illustrates the pattern 
of their responses by object. 
In sum, these findings show that 4- and 5-year-olds understand that 
current ownership of an object depends on past acquisition events, whereas 
object use does not. Furthermore, their explanations of ownership are sensitive 
to likelihood. The findings also rule out the concern that findings from 
Experiment 1 only resulted because physical interaction is more typical of 
ownership than liking. This factor does not differentiate ownership from current 
use, and yet the current experiment shows that children's explanations of these 
outcomes differed nonetheless. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 2: The proportion of 4- and 5-year-olds' responses in 
which ownership of each object was explained as resulting from making or 
finding. 
 
General Discussion 
In two experiments, we examined preschoolers' ability to infer history 
when explaining an outcome. In our tasks, preschoolers were given minimal 
information to base their explanations upon. They were only told the outcomes 
they were to explain (e.g., “This is the boy's rock”) and nothing else. This is 
less information than in previous experiments examining children's 
explanations (Legare et al., 2009; Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Schulz 
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children can explain known outcomes and events by reasoning backward in 
time to uncover unknown but plausible prior causes. 
We found that preschoolers as young as 4 years of age are sophisticated 
in their ability to infer history when explaining everyday outcomes. Children 
aged 4 and 5 readily inferred history when explaining outcomes that depended 
on past events, but not when explaining outcomes for which past events were 
not relevant. They regularly inferred history when explaining why a person 
owns an object, but rarely when explaining why a person likes an object 
(Experiment 1) or is using it (Experiment 2). Moreover, 4- and 5-year-olds used 
causal reasoning to produce their history-based explanations. They understood 
that acquiring an object can cause it to become owned, but does not explain 
why a person prefers it (Experiment 1) or uses it (Experiment 2). For example, 
they often said the boy owns the rock “because he found it,” but never gave this 
response when explaining why the boy likes the rock, or is playing with it. 
Furthermore, 4- and 5-year-olds produced inferences that reflected their 
knowledge that different outcomes have typical ways of being caused. In the 
current experiments, each object could have been acquired in a few ways (e.g., 
pictures can become owned by being made, given as gifts, or bought). However, 
each object has a likely way of becoming owned (e.g., simple pictures are 
typically made). Children provided the most typical cause of ownership for 
each object (both experiments), and thus inferred past events that plausibly 
happened. How did children know which causes were typical for each object? 
One possibility is that children are sensitive to the distributional input of the 
 34 
 
way that people come to own different kinds of things. For example, they may 
know that although people can buy rocks, finding rocks is more common. If 
children's responses were driven by sensitivity to distributional input, these 
findings would lend additional evidence that children use statistical evidence 
when producing explanations (Lombrozo, 2007; Schulz et al., 2007). An 
alternative possibility is that children believe there is only one way to acquire 
each object. For example, they may believe that pictures can only become 
owned by being made. As such, investigating between these possibilities is an 
area for future research. 
Developmental Differences 
In contrast to the 4- and 5-year-olds, 3-year-olds did not use historical 
inferences to explain ownership (Experiment 1). Furthermore, their 
explanations for ownership and liking did not differ in any way. They inferred 
history and referred to acquisition principles equally often in the ownership and 
liking conditions, but at low rates (< 15% of explanations in both conditions). 
Why did 3-year-olds' responses differ from those of older children? We 
consider four accounts of their difficulty. 
First, 3-year-olds may be generally bad at producing explanations. If 
this were true, it would be expected that they would do poorly when 
explaining all outcomes. This account is ruled out by our finding that 3-year-
olds produced plenty of explanations in both conditions (75% of 3-year-olds 
produced informative explanations), and is also ruled out by previous studies 
that found that 3-year-olds can produce explanations (e.g., Legare et al., 2009). 
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Second, 3-year-olds may not be aware of which particular actions cause 
ownership. For example, 3-year-olds may not know that making a picture 
causes the artist to own it, whereas older children may appreciate this. Because 
older children know that making a picture causes ownership, they had a reason 
to infer history (i.e., “The girl made the picture”), whereas 3-year-olds may not. 
However, we can rule out this account, at least for children's explanations of the 
picture. Three-year-olds appreciate that by investing creative labor in an object, 
a person can become the owner of it (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). This suggests 
that for the picture trial, 3-year-olds had the necessary causal knowledge to 
guide their inferences about the past. 
Third, 3-year-olds might have difficulty with certain forms of causal 
reasoning. Although they might able to reason from cause to outcome, they 
could have difficulty reasoning backward from outcome to cause. For example, 
they might be able to predict that an artist who draws a picture will own it 
(cause  outcome), but have difficulty reasoning that the artist owns a drawing 
because the artist drew it (outcome  cause). Such difficulty would make it 
impossible for children to generate historical inferences and also to infer other 
kinds of causes. This is unlikely to explain 3-year-olds' difficulty, though, 
because previous findings suggest children show the opposite asymmetry; they 
are more successful at explaining that sickness is caused by contamination 
(outcome  cause) than they are at predicting that contamination causes 
sickness (cause  outcome; Legare et al., 2009). 
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Fourth, and most likely in our view, 3-year-olds may have found our 
task difficult because they had such little information to base their explanations 
on. They were only told the outcome to be explained and nothing else. 
Although 3-year-olds produced informative explanations, many of these 
explanations were based on the little information they were given. For example, 
by observing that the rock is gray, 3-year-olds could generate explanations such 
as “the boy likes it because it's gray.” Such explanations are less generative than 
those that make reference to entities and events not provided to children (e.g., 
the event of finding). Producing generative explanations might be especially 
taxing for 3-year-olds because doing so likely requires executive control of 
memory (i.e., to actively search semantic memory for relevant information 
about the kinds of events that can cause an outcome; e.g., Tomita, Ohbayashi, 
Nakahara, Hasegawa, & Miyashita, 1999) and because executive functioning is 
quite immature at this age (e.g., Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008). Three-year-
olds' performance might improve if the stimuli provided more information. For 
instance, if shown a forest scene with rocks on the ground, they might find it 
easier to generate the explanation that the boy found the rock on the ground. 
Inferring History in Explanations 
The current findings suggest that children infer history for outcomes that 
depend on past events, but not for outcomes that do not—children inferred 
history when explaining ownership, but not when explaining liking or object 
use. These findings have implications for children's explanations in other 
domains. For example, consider the domain of theory of mind. Current beliefs 
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often depend on prior observations. For example, a man may believe a ball is in 
a drawer (even though it is not currently there) because he previously saw it 
there. Hence, when explaining why the man believes the ball is there, children 
might infer that he previously saw it in the drawer, even if they were not 
provided with this information. In contrast, children might not infer history 
when explaining people's desires, because current desires often depend on 
present facts rather than on past events. For example, a woman might desire ice 
cream because she currently wants something sweet. Previous studies have only 
required children to explain characters' current actions (e.g., Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1989; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004) and have not contrasted 
explanations of beliefs and desires. 
In addition, although history is typically more relevant for ownership 
than liking, there are instances where history is relevant for liking. “Authentic” 
objects are often valued because of their distinctive history—for example, 
original creations, such as the first bicycle ever made, are valued because they 
occupy an important place in history. By the time they are in kindergarten, 
children appreciate that original creations belong in museums (Frazier & 
Gelman, 2009), and so perhaps they might refer to history when explaining why 
original creations (and other objects valued for their histories) are liked by 
people. Consistent with this, in the few cases where children inferred history in 
the liking condition (Experiment 1, 13% of responses in the liking condition), 
they predominantly referred to the picture (an original creation) and said that 
the girl liked it because she made it. 
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Another question for future research concerns whether inferring history 
in explanation may help children in categorization and related judgments. 
Historical inferences have been claimed to influence people's judgments in a 
variety of domains, including judgments about whether an object is an artifact 
or a natural kind (Gelman & Kremer, 1991), judgments regarding the functions 
of artifacts (e.g., Kelemen, Seston, & St. Georges, 2012; Matan & 
Carey, 2001), and judgments regarding how both artifacts (e.g., Bloom, 1996; 
Preissler & Bloom, 2008) and biological kinds (Lombrozo & Rehder, 2012) 
should be categorized. Moreover, producing explanations aids adult's ability to 
categorize by helping them discover subtle similarities underlying category 
membership (Williams & Lombrozo, 2013). Hence, having children produce 
explanations, which might contain historical inferences, could influence their 
judgments in domains for which history is important. 
Understanding Ownership 
Our findings are also informative about children's reasoning about 
ownership in three important ways. First, they support the proposal that 
children use historical reasoning to understand ownership (Friedman, Neary, 
Defeyter, & Malcolm, 2011; Friedman, Van de Vondervoort, Defeyter, & 
Neary, 2013; Gelman et al., 2012; Neary et al., 2012).  
Overwhelmingly, preschoolers used past acquisition of an object to 
explain ownership and rarely to explain other outcomes such as preference or 
object use. Their discussion of past acquisition indicates that they understand 
that ownership results from past investment upon an object, and other person–
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object relations (e.g., liking, use) do not. For example, preschoolers said that the 
boy found the rock when explaining why he owns it. These findings conflict 
with claims that preschoolers' reasoning about ownership is primarily based on 
simple cues, such as physical associations between an object and a person, and 
verbal testimony (Blake & Harris, 2011; also see Blake, Ganea, & 
Harris, 2012). In contrast to these claims, we found that 4- and 5-year-olds 
explained ownership by inferring past events, which they neither witnessed nor 
were told. 
Second, this is one of the first studies to examine children's 
understanding of the specific ways objects become owned. Most previous 
studies only investigated children's understanding of object acquisition using 
scenarios where ownership was transferred (e.g., Blake & Harris, 2009; 
Friedman & Neary, 2008; Kanngiesser et al., 2010). In our tasks, preschoolers 
demonstrated an appreciation of ownership acquisition by referencing making, 
buying, and finding in their explanations. Specifically, preschoolers' use 
of making to explain why the girl owns the picture demonstrates an appreciation 
that creative labor can cause ownership. This finding builds upon previous work 
suggesting that children appreciate that ownership of an object can be 
transferred to a person who creatively modifies it (Kanngiesser et al., 2010). 
Preschoolers' use of buying to explain ownership indicates an understanding 
that monetary investment can cause ownership. These are the first findings to 
demonstrate that 4-year-olds possess this knowledge; the only previous study to 
examine this only showed that 5- to 6-year-olds understand that buying an 
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object can cause ownership (Cram & Ng, 1989). Furthermore, this study is the 
first to explore whether children understand that finding an object can cause 
ownership and shows that 4-year-olds appreciate this. Natural kinds are 
typically not owned, and preschoolers know this (Neary et al., 2012). Hence, 
preschoolers' explanations may indicate that they realize that finding an 
unowned object can cause it to become owned. As a whole, this study 
demonstrates children's profound appreciation of how objects become owned. 
Third, although previous research has suggested that preschoolers 
distinguish between ownership and liking (Friedman, 2008; Friedman & 
Neary, 2008; Malcolm, Defeyter, & Friedman, 2012), our findings go further by 
indicating that children understand that events that are causally relevant for 
ownership are not relevant for liking or using an object. For example, when 
children were asked “Why is the girl looking at the picture?” they often referred 
to her mental states (e.g., “Because she wants to”). The preference to discuss 
mental states rather than past events suggests that children distinguished 
between what causes use and ownership. 
It may be surprising that young children have such a detailed understanding of 
how objects become owned. However, knowing both who owns an object and 
how they are typically acquired is important. Young children may use this 
detailed knowledge of what causes ownership to help them avoid conflict. For 
example, if children did not appreciate that only particular events cause 
ownership, then after simply playing with a toy, they could believe they own it. 
This could lead to conflicts between owners and mere users of objects. In 
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addition, young children may use their causal knowledge to help them acquire 
objects they desire. For instance, if a girl wants a toy she sees on TV, knowing 
the toy must be bought in a store will help her obtain it. 
Conclusion 
Taken together our findings demonstrate that 4- and 5-year-olds have a 
robust ability to infer history in their explanations; in contrast, 3-year-olds do 
not appear to show this ability. Although further research is needed, we 
speculate that this developmental improvement results from increases in 
children's executive control of memory, which is likely needed to generate 
explanations. The findings also show that 4- and 5-year-olds appreciate a 
variety of ways in which an object can become owned, and know which events 
are most likely to cause ownership depending on the type of object. 
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Introduction 
People have cared about ownership of property for a very long time. 
Ancient legal systems, such as the Laws of Manu, the Code of Hammurabi, the 
Hittite Code, and Ancient Roman Law, included rules governing property use, 
and some punished certain property violations with death (Bühler 1886; Good, 
1967; Robinson, 2007). Today ownership still governs how objects may be 
used. For example, if a smart phone belongs to you it is acceptable to use it to 
make phone calls, to play Angry Birds, or to send emails; however, if it belongs 
to a colleague, then it is unacceptable to use it in any of these ways without 
permission. In everyday life, understanding ownership rights is an important 
part of understanding object use.  
 Awareness of ownership begins early in development, and 
considerations of ownership are important in very young children’s reasoning 
about objects. For example, 2-years-olds can identify familiar objects belonging 
to themselves and family members (Fasig, 2000). They also defend their own 
ownership rights (Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011) and appeal to 
ownership in disputes over their property (Ross, 1996).   
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 Young children also have some appreciation of others’ ownership rights 
(for a recent review see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2013). 
Three-year-olds sometimes protest if someone acts adversely towards another’s 
property (Rossano et al., 2011; also see Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011) 
For example, 3-year-olds may tell a puppet to “stop” if he tries to steal or 
damage someone else’s hat. Also, young children side with owners when an 
owner and non-owner have conflicting wishes about how an object should be 
used. Children aged 3 to 7 judge that a girl should be able to use her own 
crayon immediately, even if someone else needs the crayon to finish a project 
(Neary & Friedman, 2014). Similarly, 4- to 8-year-olds believe objects should 
only be lent or discarded if the owner approves (Kim & Kalish, 2009). Children 
have similar beliefs about intellectual property. For instance, 5- and 6-year olds 
negatively evaluate someone who copies another person’s idea (Shaw & Olson, 
2011).  
 Although these previous studies show that children respect ownership, 
they leave important issues unaddressed about how young children represent 
ownership rights. Theories of ownership typically posit that a few broad 
principles underlie peoples’ reasoning about ownership rights (Jackendoff, 
1992 Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Snare, 1972); these principles distinguish 
reasoning about ownership from reasoning about other social norms (e.g., 
norms of politeness, norms of gender roles). However, it is unknown if young 
children reason about ownership rights using broad principles. Instead, children 
could heed narrower, context-specific, rules.  Hence, the study of young 
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children’s reasoning about ownership is relevant to wider questions in cognitive 
development regarding whether young children reason in terms of broad 
abstract principles, or more specific, context-dependent rules (Gopnik, 2003; 
Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Smith & Colunga, 2012). We discuss three 
unresolved issues related to this question. 
Harmless Violations 
 The first issue concerns children’s views of the range of object uses 
influenced by ownership rights. Adults typically refrain from using another’s 
property, even when using it would be harmless and would not affect the owner 
in any way. However, previous studies only presented children with situations 
where someone deprived or tried to deprive the owner of property. Rossano et 
al. (2011) confronted children with a puppet who stole or threw way another’s 
hat. Kim and Kalish (2009) asked children about situations where someone 
wanted to throw away or lend another’s object without approval. Neary and 
Friedman (2014) used scenarios where the owner could not use her own crayon 
because someone else was using it. Because these studies only required children 
to consider scenarios where owners were deprived of their property, it is 
possible that children consider more harmless ownership violations to be 
acceptable. 
 Such ownership judgments could arise if children’s judgments about 
ownership rights are solely based on a heuristic that owners should not be 
prevented from using their property. Previous findings are consistent with this 
possibility (Kim & Kalish, 2009; Neary & Friedman, 2014; Rossano et al., 
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2011). Children’s use of such a heuristic could result from parental input. 
Observational studies show that parents are inconsistent in their treatment of 
ownership violation, but are most likely to intervene when ownership violations 
are severe and could deprive the owner of property (Ross, 1996; Ross, Filyer, 
Lollis, Perlman, & Martin, 1994). Moreover, children tattle most often about 
these same transgressions (Ross & den Bak-Lammers, 1998). As such, it is 
possible that young children only consider it unacceptable to use another’s 
property when using it deprives or interferes with the owner. Alternatively, 
children may be similar to adults and appreciate that ownership rights influence 
a broad range of object uses, including harmless ways of using another’s 
property. 
Presence of Owner  
 The second issue concerns children’s views of the contexts in which 
ownership rights influence object use. In all previous studies examining 
ownership violations, the owner, property and non-owner were always present 
together (Kim & Kalish, 2009; Neary & Friedman, 2014; Rossano et al., 2011). 
However, on many occasions, people encounter property and respect that it is 
impermissible to use it, even though the owner’s identity is unknown and the 
owner is not nearby. For example, adults do not typically try on others’ coats at 
a coat-check, even if the owners are not around, and even if the owners’ 
identities are unknown. Children may not share these intuitions and may believe 
that it is acceptable to use property when the owner is not present. Blake and 
Harris (2011) propose that children’s understanding of ownership is largely 
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based on visual associations between an object and its owner. In this account, 
children may find violations of owner’s rights to be more salient when the 
owner is known and visible.  
Entitlement, Restriction, or Both 
 The third issue concerns the principles that underlie children’s judgment 
of ownership rights. Accounts of ownership often distinguish between two 
ways that ownership affects property use. First, ownership may confer the 
privilege of using property to only the owner. Some theorists refer to this 
privilege as the Right of Use (Jackendoff, 1992 Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; 
Snare, 1972). If children view owners as having this privilege then they should 
view people as more entitled to use their own objects, than other’s or ownerless 
objects. Second, ownership may act to restrict people from using others’ 
property. Some theorists refer to this as the Right of Exclusion (Cohen, 1954; 
Merrill, 1998). If children view ownership as having this consequence, they 
should view people as restricted from using others’ objects, but equally entitled 
to use their own and ownerless objects. It is unknown whether children view 
ownership as conferring privileges to owners, restrictions to non-owners, or 
both. 
The Current Experiments 
 The current experiments address these three core issues. Experiment 1 
explores whether children view harmless object use as influenced by ownership 
rights, and whether children respect ownership rights when the owner is neither 
known nor visible. Experiment 2 explores these issues as well as the principles 
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that underlie children’s judgment of ownership rights. To explore these issues, 
Experiment 1 examined 4- to 6-year-old’s views regarding the use of human-
made property, and Experiment 2 examined 4- and 5-year-old’s views 
regarding owned and ownerless natural objects; we also tried testing 3-year-
olds in Experiment 2, but they were unable to perform the experimental task. 
Across the two experiments, we tried testing children ranging from 3- to 6-
years because we were interested in tracking early development in children’s 
reasoning about ownership rights, and, as reviewed above, recent research 
suggests that children’s awareness of others’ ownership rights first emerges at 
ages three and four. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. Eighty-four children were tested, including 29 4-year-olds 
(M=4;6 years, range=4;0-4;11, 12 girls), 27 5-year-olds (M=5;4 years, 
range=5;0-5;11, 13 girls) and 28 6-year-olds (M=6;4, range=6;0-6;11, 13 girls). 
Although demographics were not formally collected, most children were from 
white middle class homes. 
 Materials and Procedures. Children in each age group were randomly 
assigned to either an Agent owns or an Other owns condition. The Agent owns 
condition consisted of three test trials. In each trial, children were shown a 
picture of a person beside an object (boy and teddy bear; boy and hat; girl and 
ball; see Figure 6 for all pictures shown. First, the experimenter briefly 
introduced the picture (e.g., “Here is a boy, and here is a ball”), and explained 
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that the person owns the object (e.g., “It is the boy’s ball. It belongs to him”). 
Next, children were asked to list what the person is allowed to do with the 
object (e.g., “What is the boy allowed to do with the ball?”). Children received 
the three test trials in one of six different orders.  
 
 
Figure 6. Pictures shown in Experiment 1 and 2.  
 
The same procedure was used in the Other owns condition with one 
exception. Rather than being told that the person in each trial owns the object, 
children were told that the person does not own the object (e.g., “It is not the 
boy’s ball. It does not belong to him”).  
Children in both conditions could produce as many responses as they 
wished. To encourage them, children were told that each response was a “Good 
idea” or Great idea,” regardless of the quality of the answer. Trials ended in two 
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ways. Children either told the experimenter that they had no more answers (e.g., 
“no more ideas”), or were silent for longer than three seconds. To confirm that 
children’s silence meant they were done, the experimenter asked the child if 
they had “Any more ideas?” or “Anything else?” If children responded yes, 
then the trial continued.  
 Occasionally children offered responses completely unrelated to the 
task (e.g., one child generated a list animals). In these cases, children were 
reminded to stay on topic (e.g., “But what about the boy and the ball?”). If they 
continued giving irrelevant answers (e.g., listed more animals), the 
experimenter moved onto the next trial.  
 Transcription and Coding. Testing sessions were audio recorded onto 
a laptop and then transcribed by a research assistant. Before coding began, 
children’s responses were separated from the rest of the transcript and randomly 
sorted. Because of this, responses could not be associated with their condition 
during coding. Each response was initially coded as informative or 
uninformative. Most responses were deemed informative. The only responses 
considered uninformative were those completely unrelated to the task (e.g., “I 
know a magic trick”), or those indicating that the child did not know an answer 
(e.g., “I don’t know”).1  
Two coders then independently coded all informative responses into one 
of 6 categories: modification, sharing-giving, contact-without-modification, 
                                                          
1 Children gave irrelevant or unintelligible responses in 29 of the 288 trials in Experiment 1, and 
in 22 of the 88 trials in Experiment 2. These responses were not included in the analyses, but 
the few children who only gave such responses were included (i.e, they contributed scores of 0). 
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return-to-owner/appeals-to-authority, limitations, or use-without-contact. 
Responses in the modification category described the actor purposely 
modifying the object. Responses in the sharing-giving category described either 
the actor sharing the object with others (“play with friends”) or giving the 
object away (“give it to his little sister”). These two were combined because 
often it was difficult to distinguish between giving away permanently and 
sharing. Responses in the contact-without-modification category included 
responses which described the person coming in contact with the object but not 
modifying it (e.g., “He’s wearing it”). The return-to-owner/appeals-to-
authority category included responses which suggested that the actor should 
return the object to its owner (e.g., “Find who owns it”) or ask an adult what to 
do (e.g., “Tell the teacher”). These were grouped as one category because 
children often mentioned them concurrently, making them difficult to isolate 
(e.g., “He should ask his mom to give it back”). Responses in the limitations 
category referenced actions the person could not do (e.g., “He can’t touch it” or 
“He can’t hurt it”). This category also included object use that was conditional 
on the owner’s involvement (e.g., “Her and the owner could play catch”). 
Finally, explanations in the no-contact category described the person interacting 
with the object without touching it or the person’s thoughts about the objects 
(e.g., “look at it” or “want it”).  
The inter-coder-reliability was excellent (Cohen's Kappa = 0.89). All 
disagreements were resolved by discussion. (During discussion coders noticed 
four notable responses which did not fit into our coding scheme. These 
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responses occurred in the Agent owns condition and claimed that the person 
should be allowed to “have” the object or “keep it forever”. Because these 
occurred very infrequently, they were not analyzed.) 
Results and Discussion 
First, we wanted to examine whether children viewed people in the 
Agent owns condition as more entitled to use objects than people in the Other 
owns condition. To do this, children were assigned a maximum entitlement 
score which indicated how freely an object could be used. To derive this score, 
all responses were first individually given one of three entitlement scores: 2 for 
responses in the modification category and for responses in the sharing-giving 
category, 1 for responses in the contact-without-modification category, and 0 
for responses in all other categories. Next, the highest score was identified and 
used as that child’s maximum entitlement score.  
We assigned a greater entitlement score for modification and sharing-
giving because these actions, unlike use-without-modification, are almost 
exclusively reserved for owners. People often can use objects they do not 
own—they eat with silverware in restaurants and cafés, they read books 
borrowed from the library, and they wear clothing borrowed from friends. 
However, modifying these objects, or transferring ownership of them, is 
typically unacceptable (at least without special permission).    
 An ANOVA analyzed whether maximum entitlement scores differed by 
age (four, five, six) and condition (Agent owns, Other owns); Figure 7 shows 
the means scores in each condition. Although Levene’s test of equality of error 
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of variances was violated, F(5,78) = 5.56, p < .001, an ANOVA was still 
deemed appropriate as the two samples were of identical sizes, and the largest 
standard deviation was less than four times greater than the smallest (Howell, 
2010, p. 334). Children’s entitlement scores were higher in the Agent owns 
condition than in the Other owns condition, F(1,78) =50.07, MSE =0.37 , p < 
.001, ŋ2p = 0.39. Age was not a predictor of children’s scores, F(2,78) = 0.59, 
MSE = 0.37, p = .555, ŋ2p = 0.02, nor did it enter into an age by condition 
interaction, F(2,78) = 2.04, MSE = 0.37, p = .138, ŋ2p = 0.05. 
   
Figure 7. All Ages, Average Maximum Entitlement Score in Experiments 1 
(Left) and 2 (Right). 
 
 We then examined whether this difference between conditions was also 
reflected in the frequency of responses given in each of the three entitlement 
categories (see Table 1). These analyses were conducted using Mann-Whitney 
U tests. (The same pattern of results was found when examining whether 
children were more likely to give responses in each category at least once.) 
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 Age Condition N Modification 
(SD) 
Contact-
without-
modification 
(SD) 
Sharing-
giving (SD) 
Return-to-
owner/appeals-
to-authority 
(SD) 
Limitations 
(SD) 
No-contact 
(SD) 
Exp. 1 4 Agent owns 14 0.21 (0.58) 6.36 (2.79) 0.14 (0.53) 0.00 (0.00) 0.21 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00) 
  Other owns 15 0.07 (0.26) 1.87 (5.40) 0.67 (1.45) 1.27 (1.98) 1.20 (2.4) 0.13 (0.35) 
 5 Agent owns 14 0.07 (0.27) 10.64 (5.92) 1.00 (1.52) 0.07 (0.27) 0.14 (0.53) 0.29 (0.61) 
  Other owns 13 0.00 (0.00) 0.85 (1.82) 0.00 (0.00) 1.62 (1.89) 1.23 (1.64) 0.00 (0.00) 
 6 Agent owns 14 0.00 (0.00) 8.64 (3.32) 0.93 (1.27) 0.07 (0.27) 0.14 (0.53) 0.00 (0.00) 
  Other owns 14 0.07 (0.27) 1.07 (2.09) 0.29 (0.73) 3.00 (2.57) 1.43 (1.65) 0.00 (0.00) 
Exp. 2 4-5 Agent owns 15 1.73 (2.79) 2.47 (2.36) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.26) 1.07 (1.79) 
  Nobody 
owns 
15 0.36 (1.08) 0.36 (0.74) 0.00 (0.00) 0.50 (1.16) 0.57 (0.85) 0.64 (1.74) 
  Other owns 14 1.67 (2.44) 1.33 (2.19) 0.00 (0.00) 0.07 (0.26) 0.40 (0.63) 1.13 (1.25) 
Table 1. Experiments 1 and 2. Mean Use of Entitlement Categories Per Trial 
with Standard Deviations in Brackets. 
 Modification Category. The number of responses in the modification 
category did not differ by condition, Mann-Whitney U = 860.00, p = .631. 
Notably, responses in this category were given very infrequently, making up 
less than 2% of all responses.  
 Sharing-giving Category. Children discussed sharing-giving more 
frequently in the Agent owns condition than in the Other owns condition, Mann-
Whitney U = 707.00, p = .032.  
 Contact-without-modification Category. Children discussed the contact-
without-modification more often in the Agent owns condition than in the Other 
owns condition, Mann-Whitney U = 83.50, p < 0.001.  
 We also examined the frequency responses in the no-contact category. 
We did not expect frequency to differ by condition because this category 
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includes actions such as thinking about an object, or smelling it, which should 
be unaffected by ownership. As expected they did not, Mann-Whitney U = 681, 
p = .647. 
 Lastly, we examined whether children viewed people as more restricted 
from using objects in the Other owns condition than in the Agent owns 
condition. To examine this, children were assigned a restriction score. This 
score is similar to the maximum entitlement score assigned earlier. However, 
because no categories indicated restriction more than the others, we did not give 
children a weighted score. Instead children were scored 1 if they gave responses 
in either the return-to-own/appeal-to-authority category or limitations category; 
children who never gave a response in either category were scored 0. A Fisher’s 
exact test revealed that more children spoke about restriction in the Other owns 
condition than in the Agent owns condition, p < .001. See Figure 8 for mean 
restriction scores by condition.  
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Figure 8. All Ages, Proportion of Children Discussing Restrictions At Least 
Once, in Experiments 1 (Left) and 2 (Right). 
 
 These findings suggest that children view people as more entitled to use 
their own property than others’ property. These findings also suggest that 
children view people as restricted in how they can use others’ property. These 
findings arose even though the owner was not present (or even known) in the 
Other owns condition, and differences even arose for harmless actions (i.e., 
actions in the use-without-modification category). This suggests that by age 4, 
children reason about ownership using a very broad principle (or broad 
principles), not specific to context or type of object use.  
However, this experiment leaves the nature of this principle unclear. 
Children could either view ownership as influencing object use by entitling 
owners or by restricting non-owners (or both). Because these two accounts 
(entitlement, restriction) make different predictions about how people may use 
ownerless objects, Experiment 2 uses such objects to explore this issue. 
According to the entitlement account, ownership confers the privilege of using 
property to the owner. In this account, entitlement to use an object only applies 
to its owner. Hence, this account predicts that children would view people as 
less entitled to use ownerless and other owned objects, than personally owned 
objects. Alternatively, the restriction account views ownership as restricting 
non-owners from using property. Because restriction only applies to objects 
owned by someone else, this account predicts that children would view people 
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as less entitled to use other owned objects than ownerless and personally owned 
objects. Because we were mainly interested in children’s entitlement reasoning, 
and no age differences were found between ages four to six in any entitlement 
analyses, we did not include children aged six.  
Also, in Experiment 1, children rarely discussed modification. Although 
it could be that children believe owners are restricted from modifying property 
altogether (see Kim & Kalish, 2009), it is also possible that children think it is 
undesirable to modify manufactured goods (e.g., clothing, toys). If this is the 
case, then children may think it is acceptable to modify natural objects; 
Experiment 2 explores this possibility.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. Forty-four children were tested, including 25 4-year-olds 
(M = 4;5, range = 4;0-4;11, 10 girls) and 19 5-year-olds (M = 5;5, range= 5;0-
5;11, 8 girls). An additional 5 children were tested, but excluded from our 
analyses for failing the comprehension question.2   
Materials and Procedures. The method differed from Experiment 1 in 
a few ways. First, Experiment 2 had only two test trials and used only natural 
objects (trial one tree, trial two flower). Second, children participated in an 
additional Nobody owns condition, where they were told that the object is 
ownerless (e.g., “It is no-one’s tree. It doesn’t belong to anyone”). Hence, each 
                                                          
2 The task was also run on 15 3-year-olds. However, testing was discontinued because they 
found the task too difficult. Most 3-year-olds were silent, or failed the comprehension 
questions. 
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child was randomly assigned to one of the three conditions. Third, in the Other 
owns condition, we specified who owns the object, always referring to a person 
of the opposite gender from the person shown in the picture (e.g., “It belongs to 
a girl. It is a girl’s tree”). As before, this owner was not shown. Lastly, a 
comprehension question was asked at the end of each trial to confirm children’s 
understanding of the ownership information. Children were asked “Does the 
[object] belong to anyone?”, if they responded “yes” they were then asked 
“who does it belong to?” Children who answered this incorrectly were excluded 
from the analysis. After the first 17 children were tested, we made a slight 
addition to the procedure and also asked children to repeat the ownership 
information immediately after it was given. Of the 5 children excluded for 
failing a comprehension question all failed the question after this addition. 
Transcription and Coding. The same coding and transcription 
methods were used as Experiment 1. Inter-coder-reliability was excellent 
(Cohen's Kappa = 0.84). All disagreements were resolved by discussion.  
Results and Discussion 
 The scoring methods remained the same as Experiment 1. First, we 
examined whether children viewed people’s entitlement to use objects as 
differing for personally owned objects, other owned objects, and ownerless 
objects. To do this, children’s maximum entitlement scores were calculated and 
an ANOVA analyzed whether maximum entitlement scores differed by 
condition (Agent owns, Other owns, Nobody owns); Figure 2 shows the mean 
scores in each condition. Although Levene’s test of equality of error of 
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variances was again violated, F(2,41) = 3.41, p = .043, an ANOVA was still 
deemed appropriate as the three samples were of almost identical sizes, and the 
largest standard deviation was less than four times greater than the smallest 
(Howell, 2010, p. 334). Condition had a main effect on children’s maximum 
entitlement scores, F(2,41) = 5.10, MSE = 0.62, p = .001, ŋ2p = 0.29.3 
Children’s entitlement scores were higher in the Agent owns condition than the 
Other owns condition, Tukey HSD p =.001. Children similarly had higher 
entitlement scores in the Nobody owns condition than the Other owns condition, 
Tukey HSD p = .031. People in the Agent owns condition and the Nobody owns 
were considered to be similarly entitled, Tukey HSD p =.355. 
 We then examined using Mann-Whitney U tests, whether these 
differences were reflected in the frequency of responses in the three entitlement 
categories (see Table 1). (The same pattern of results was found when 
examining whether children were more likely to give responses in each 
category at least once).  
 Modification Category. Children discussed modification more often in 
the Agent owns condition than in the Other owns condition, Mann-Whitney U = 
51.00, p = .001. They also discussed modification more often in the Nobody 
owns condition than in the Other owns condition, Mann-Whitney U = 63.50, p 
= .032. Children discussed modification as often in the Agent owns condition 
and the Nobody owns condition, Mann-Whitney U = 109.00, p = .880. 
                                                          
3 A preliminary ANOVA included age as a factor, and confirmed that it was not a significant 
predictor of children’s scores, and that there was no age by condition interaction, both ps > .21.  
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 Sharing-giving Category. Children never discussed sharing or giving so 
it could not be analyzed. 
 Contact-without-modification Category. Children discussed contact-
without-modification more in the Agent owns condition than in the Other owns 
condition, Mann-Whitney U = 36.50, p = .008. Discussion of contact-without-
modification did not differ between the Nobody owns and Agent owns 
conditions, Mann-Whitney U = 70.00, p = .066, and also did not differ between 
the Nobody owns condition and the Other owns condition, Mann-Whitney U = 
81.50, p = .211.  
As in Experiment 1, we also examined whether the frequency of no-
contact responses differed by condition and found, as expected, they did not 
differ, all p’s > .308. 
 Lastly, as in Experiment 1, we examined whether children viewed 
people’s restriction from using an objects as differing for personally owned 
objects, other owned objects, and ownerless objects. To do this, we examined 
how children’s restriction scores differed by age and condition; Figure 8 shows 
the mean restriction scores by condition. An initial Fisher’s exact test revealed 
that restriction score varied across the three conditions, p = .033. More children 
spoke about restriction in the Other owns condition than in the Agent owns 
condition, Fisher’s Exact Test, p = .014. No other differences between 
conditions were found, all p’s > .169.  
 These results suggest that children appreciate that people are more 
entitled to use personally owned objects and ownerless objects, than others’ 
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objects. These results also replicate those in Experiment 1 suggesting that 
children appreciate that people’s use of others’ property is more restricted than 
use of personally owned property. These findings support the restriction 
account of ownership; this is discussed further. Unlike Experiment 1, children 
appreciated that personally owned and ownerless natural objects may be 
modified, but others’ objects cannot. 
General Discussion 
 Two experiments examined how ownership influences 4- to 6-year-olds 
reasoning about what a person is allowed to do with an object. We found that 
children offered sophisticated responses. Children appreciated that people can 
use their own property and ownerless property more freely than others’ 
property. For example, many children in Experiment 2 said a person could 
modify personally owned and ownerless objects, but not objects owned by 
someone else. Children also offered more restrictions (e.g., “Don’t touch it”) 
when objects were owned by someone else than when they were personally 
owned. Children also discussed harmless uses (contact-without-modification 
category) less often when objects were owned by someone else than when they 
were personally owned. In contrast, children appreciated that as long as 
someone is not touching an object (no-contact category), ownership does not 
influence what they may do. For example, children understood that people may 
smell another’s flower, but not touch it. Children also appreciated that owners 
could modify natural objects, but not manufactured objects. We discuss how 
our findings relate to important issues concerning children’s reasoning about 
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ownership rights, and their broader implications for the representation of 
ownership and morality.  
Harmless Violations 
 We investigated children’s views of the range of object uses that 
ownership rights affect. In everyday life, it is impermissible to use another’s 
property, even harmlessly. However, previous studies of ownership rights (Kim 
& Kalish, 2009; Neary & Friedman., 2014; Rossano et al., 2011) left open the 
possibility that children think it is acceptable to use others’ property harmlessly 
or in ways that cannot deprive the owner.  
 If children thought it was acceptable to harmlessly use another’s 
property, they should have mentioned contact-without-modification actions 
when discussing how non-owners can use another’s property. Such actions 
would not affect the owner’s use of property or damage the property in anyway. 
However, few children mentioned these actions when specifying how another’s 
property could be used. In Experiment 1, only 29% of children thought that 
people could use others’ property harmlessly; conversely, 100% of children 
thought that people could use their own property harmlessly; in Experiment 2, 
21% and 80%. 
 These findings show that children understand it is typically 
unacceptable to use others’ property, even harmlessly. As such, the findings 
rule out the possibility that children reason about ownership rights using a 
narrow heuristic that owners should not be prevented from using their property. 
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Like adults, children appreciate that ownership rights affect a broad range of 
object uses. 
 
Presence of Owner 
 We also investigated the effect of context on children’s respect of 
owner’s rights. In daily life, people uphold owners’ rights over property even 
when the owners are not near their property, and their identity is unknown. 
However, previous studies left open the possibility that children view it 
acceptable to use others’ property when they are not nearby (Kim & Kalish, 
2009; Neary & Friedman, 2014; Rossano et al., 2011). Children might also 
view this as acceptable if their reasoning about ownership depends on visual 
associations between owner’s and property, because these associations are not 
provided when the owner is absent (Blake & Harris, 2011). In our experiments 
children respected owners’ rights even though they were absent (Other owns 
conditions). Moreover, in the Other owns condition of Experiment 1, children 
were never told that the objects were owned. Instead, our findings demonstrate 
that the owner does not need to be present nor does their identity need to be 
known for children to uphold the owner’s rights. These findings are consistent 
with the proposal that when the owner of an object is unknown, children assign 
a place-holder attribute of “owned” to reason about ownership of that object 
(Blake & Harris, 2011). 
Entitlement, Restrictions, or Both 
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 Finally, we investigated the principles children use to reason about 
ownership rights. Ownership can be viewed as entitling owners to use property, 
or as restricting non-owners from using it, or both. To determine which account 
better captures children’s reasoning, we examined children’s beliefs about 
ownerless objects. Under the restriction account, ownership confers the Right of 
Exclusion and restricts people from using others’ property, but allows people to 
use their own and ownerless objects freely (Cohen, 1954; Merrill, 1998).  
However, under the entitlement account, ownership confers the Right of Use 
and entitles only owners to use objects (Jackendoff, 1992; Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976; Snare, 1972). Because the Right of Use is unique to owners, under 
this view, people’s use of ownerless objects is restricted (i.e., because as non-
owners, they are not entitled to use them). In Experiment 2 we found that 
children did not view ownerless objects in this way. They granted similar levels 
of entitlement to those using ownerless objects and personally owned objects, 
but lower levels to those using other owned objects. These findings suggest that 
children do not view entitlement to use objects as unique to ownership. As 
such, our findings are more consistent with a restriction account.  
 However, this conclusion may not apply to both natural kinds and 
artifacts. In Experiment 2, we only examined children’s judgments about only 
ownerless natural kinds. Children might reason differently about ownership 
rights for natural kinds and artifacts. This could be viewed as plausible because 
children often reason differently about artifacts and natural kinds (Brandone & 
Gelman, 2009; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Rhodes, Gelman, & Karuza, 2014), 
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and they have differing expectations about whether artifacts and natural kinds 
are owned (Neary, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2012). To directly test 
whether the restrictions account extends to artifacts, future research could 
examine children’s responses for unowned artifacts (e.g., abandoned or 
discarded artifacts). 
 However, the present findings provide some evidence that the 
restrictions account is not limited to natural kinds. Restriction-based reasoning 
would explain why children in both experiments discussed restrictions more 
often when objects belonged to someone else than when they were personally 
owned (i.e., this was found for both artifacts and natural kinds). Most of these 
instances included direct discussion of limitations or what the person was not 
allowed to do. It is striking that children discussed any such limitations, because 
they were only asked what the person was allowed to do. In Experiment 1, 43% 
of children listed limitations when discussing the use of another’s property, 
whereas only 7% of children listed any limitations when discussing the use of 
personally owned objects (Experiment 2: 36% and 7%). Children’s spontaneous 
listing of limitations may reflect the strength of their normative belief that 
others’ property should not be used.  
Broad Principles  
 In three different ways, our findings suggest that children reason about 
ownership rights using broad principles (or a broad principle). First, children 
appreciate that ownership affects a broad range of object uses. Second, they 
appreciate that ownership influences object use in a variety of contexts (e.g., 
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owner known and present and not known and not present). Third, children’s 
reasoning appears to adhere to the Right of Exclusion, which is itself a broad 
principle. This suggests that by age four children do not reason about ownership 
rights using narrow or piecemeal rules. As such, our findings are consistent 
with claims that young children reason in terms of broad abstract principles 
(e.g., Gopnik, 2003; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994).  
 How do children come to this broad understanding of ownership rights? 
One possibility is through inductive reasoning. Children have a bias to 
generalize information (Gelman, Collman & Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & 
Markman, 1986; Rhodes, Brickman & Gelman, 2008). For example, when 
learning a novel trait about three golden retrievers, children generalize that trait 
to the entire category of dogs, even in cases where adults do not (Rhodes et al., 
2008). Similarly, after viewing a few situations where ownership prevents a 
non-owner’s use of an object, children may infer a general rule that using 
another’s property is impermissible. Another related possibility is that children 
generate such a rule from their own experience with successfully excluding 
others from using property. For example, 20-month-olds exercise control over 
their belongings by preventing others from using them (Ross, 2013).  This first-
person experience with exclusion may lead young children develop a broad rule 
that owners are entitled to exclude, which would also apply to third-person 
interactions. 
 A final possibility is that children’s reasoning about ownership rights 
may be an extension of their ability to reason about bodily rights (Humphrey 
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1992; Neary & Friedman, 2014). For example, children’s appreciation that it is 
wrong to control another’s property (e.g., by holding another’s ball), may stem 
from their appreciation that it is wrong to control another’s body (e.g., by 
holding another’s arm). Hence, the broad reasoning which likely underlies 
children’s reasoning about bodily rights may carry over to their understanding 
of ownership rights. Future research might help answer this question by 
examining younger children, but using a method suitable for younger children.  
Further Directions  
 Our findings suggest possible areas for further research. First, some 
children’s responses were not consistent with the restrictions account. If 
children thought ownerless objects could be used freely, they should not have 
listed any restrictions in the Nobody owns condition. We found they sometimes 
did, though the number of children giving such restrictions did not significantly 
differ from either the Agent owns condition or the Other owns condition. These 
responses may have resulted from some children thinking that the objects were 
not truly ownerless. For example, when asked what could be done with a tree, 
some children may have thought of a tree in a park owned by the city. To 
further explore this possibility, future research could highlight the ownerless 
nature of the objects by specifying where the objects are located (e.g., an 
uninhabited island).  
 Second, our analysis assumed that children omitted actions because they 
viewed them to be unacceptable. Alternatively, children may also have omitted 
uncommon actions. For example, in the Other owns condition children may 
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have omitted harmless actions because people rarely use others’ property. 
However, this concern is largely ruled out because children often listed direct 
limitations on use (e.g., “she can’t touch it”). To explore children’s judgments 
using a method less likely to be impact by the frequency of actions, future 
research could ask children more direct follow-up questions about the 
acceptability of different kinds of object uses. Alternatively, in future research, 
children could be asked about restrictions more directly (e.g., “What can’t the 
owner/non-owner do?”). 
Third, although we could have imagined finding a developmental shift 
in children’s reasoning about ownership rights (e.g., perhaps a shift from 
reasoning in terms of specific rules to reasoning using broader principles), we 
did not.  However, we did not succeed in testing 3-year-olds. Many of the 3-
year-olds remained silent, perhaps because they found the open-ended nature of 
our task difficult. Future research should use easier tasks to investigate whether 
3-year-olds have a similarly broad respect of ownership. 
 Fourth, the present experiments appeared to differ in the frequency with 
which children discussed particular uses. In discussing artifacts (Experiment 1), 
children sometimes discussed sharing and giving, but rarely discussed 
modification (Kim & Kalish, 2009, likewise found that young children may 
view owners as generally restricted from modifying artifacts); conversely in 
discussing natural kinds (Experiment 2), they rarely discussed sharing and 
giving, but sometimes discussed modification. We could not directly compare 
findings across these two experiments because they differed in the number of 
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trials given, but future research could further investigate these differences. 
Some differences might reflect broad differences in reasoning about object 
kinds (i.e., artifacts vs. natural kinds)—for example, children might only 
appreciate that owners can modify natural but not artificial property. Other 
differences might have completely different explanations. For example, 
children might have no differing expectations about the sharing of artifacts and 
natural kinds; the low levels of sharing in Experiment 2 might have resulted 
because the tree and flower were rooted into the ground, and are non-portable. 
Finally, our findings may also have broader implications for moral 
development. Recent research suggests that children can judge victimless 
offenses to be wrong (Rottman & Keleman, 2012). Rottman & Keleman (2012) 
found that if a harmless act is described as unnatural or disgusting, 7-year-olds 
will judge it to be wrong. Our findings suggest that ownership violations may 
be another case where children view victimless acts as unacceptable. Future 
research should more directly investigate whether children view ownership 
violations as being victimless offences.  
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Chapter Four: Preschoolers’ reasoning about when ownership is 
relevant (Paper Three) 
 
A version of this paper has been accepted at Cognitive Science: 
Nancekivell, S. E., & Friedman, O. (accepted). Preschoolers explain 
acceptability with ownership. Cognitive Science.  
 
Copyright © 2016 by Cognitive Science Society, Inc. Adapted with permission.  
 
Introduction 
Suppose while on a walk, you notice your neighbor has a new garden 
gnome. You really like it, and think it would perfectly match the other gnomes 
in your garden. Hopefully, you immediately recognize that you should not take 
the gnome because it is not yours. This reaction indicates that ownership is 
influential in your reasoning about the acceptability of using objects. You 
thought about ownership without anyone pointing out its relevance to you, or 
even mentioning it. Also, you privileged ownership over other considerations 
that might have prevented you from taking the gnome, such as the difficulty of 
carrying back to your garden.   
Is ownership similarly influential in young children? Young children are 
capable of considering ownership when reasoning about the acceptability of 
using objects. For instance, 3- and 4-year-olds side with owners in conflicts 
about who should use property (Neary & Friedman, 2014), and recognize that 
property should not be used without consent (Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; 
Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014a; Rossano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). 
However, as we detail below, existing research has not examined whether 
young children’s reasoning has the properties that characterized the influence of 
 70 
 
ownership on your reasoning about the garden gnome. As such, the influence of 
ownership in young children’s reasoning is unknown. 
Recognizing that Ownership is Relevant Even When No One Mentions It 
In all previous experimental studies on ownership, the relevance of 
ownership for reasoning about acceptability was highlighted. Experimenters 
either highlighted ownership by telling children about the owner (e.g., “It is the 
girl’s ball”) or by asking them directly about ownership (e.g., “Does this ball 
belong to someone?”). This is true of studies examining children’s recognition 
of ownership rights (e.g., Kim & Kalish, 2009; Neary & Friedman, 2014; 
Rossano et al., 2011) and studies investigating how children’s judge and track 
whether objects are owned and who they are owned by (Blake, Ganea, & 
Harris, 2012 Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; Gelman, Noles, & Stilwell, 
2014; Kanngiesser & Hood, 2014; Kanngiesser, Itakura, & Hood, 2014; Neary, 
Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2012). Hence, these studies do not show 
whether children consider ownership when it is not mentioned to them. 
Observational studies suggest that children consider ownership without its 
explicit mention (i.e., they spontaneously refer to it in their disputes); however 
this mainly occurs for their own property and rarely for others’ (Dunn & Munn, 
1987; Hay & Ross, 1982; Ross, 1996, Ross, 2013). So while previous studies 
suggest that children are capable ownership reasoners, they leave open the 
possibility that ownership does not influence their reasoning unless its 
relevance is highlighted for them. Put differently, it is possible that a young 
child who wants to take your neighbor’s garden gnome might not consider its 
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owner unless someone mentions or asks about her. 
Privileging Ownership Over Other Factors Affecting Object Use 
 Many factors influence whether it is acceptable for someone to use an 
object. These include personal beliefs, object properties, welfare, authority, and 
gender stereotypes (e.g., Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Rey, 2001; 
Killen & Smetana, 1999; Laupa, 1994; Nucci & Weber, 1995; Smetana, 1989; 
Stoddart & Turiel, 1985). It is unknown whether children privilege ownership 
over these other factors when reasoning about whether it is acceptable to use an 
object. In fact, young children might be more likely to use observable properties 
of objects to reason about acceptability. This might occur because young 
children often rely on external or readily available properties of objects when 
reasoning about the world (Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Sobel, Yoachim, 
Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Blumenthal, 2007; Walker, Lombrozo, Legare & Gopnik, 
2014). For example, a young child might decide it is unacceptable to take the 
garden gnome because it is too heavy, and not because it belongs to the 
neighbor. Only one existing study has examined ownership’s influence relative 
to another factor (Neary & Friedman, 2014). This study found that 3- to 7-year-
olds believed an owner should be able to take back her property, even though 
someone else needed it to complete a goal. However, because of the limited 
scope of this study, it is unclear whether ownership is more influential than the 
many other factors that might arise in children’s reasoning about object use. 
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The Current Approach 
In this paper, we use children’s explanations to investigate the influence 
of ownership in their reasoning about the acceptability of using objects. We use 
children’s explanations because they are a window into the theories and 
principles children use to reason about the world (Carey, 1985; Legare, 
Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Rhodes, 2014; Wellman, 2011; Wellman & 
Lagattuta, 2004). We focus on children aged three to five because these are the 
first ages at which children reliably produce explanations (Wellman, 2011), and 
respect others’ ownership (for a review see Nancekivell, Van de Vondervoort, 
& Friedman, 2013).  
We conducted three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2 we examined 
whether children refer to ownership in their explanations even when it is not 
mentioned to them, and whether children reference ownership in their 
explanations more than alternative considerations. Experiment 3 only examines 
the latter issue. If children offer ownership as an explanation more often than 
other types of explanations, and when it has not been mentioned, it would 
suggest that ownership is influential in their reasoning about acceptability, and 
more influential than other factors. However, if they rarely offer ownership as 
an explanation it would suggest that ownership is not influential in their 
reasoning about acceptability.  
One concern is that we might underestimate children’s abilities because 
of the language demands explanations. However, as young as 17 months 
children can generate possessive utterances such as “mommy’s sock” (Brown, 
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1973; Tomasello, 1998) necessary for using ownership as an explanation. As 
such, preschoolers have the sufficient linguistic skills to succeed on our task. 
Any developmental differences in young children’s use of ownership to explain 
acceptability would suggest a change in their conceptual development not 
linguistic development.  
Experiment 1 
 In Experiment 1, we asked preschoolers to explain either why it was 
acceptable for a character to use one of two objects, or why a character knew 
how to use one of two objects. Knowledge was chosen because, similar to 
acceptability, it affects how and if objects are used. Although we expected that 
children might refer to ownership when explaining acceptability, we thought 
children might refer to ownership less when explaining knowledge states 
because these might depend more on other factors, such the character’s 
previous use of the object. Because we wanted to assess whether children 
recognize that ownership is relevant even when it is not highlighted, we did not 
mention ownership to them. 
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred and seven children were tested. These 
included 36 three-year-olds (M = 3;6, range = 3;0-3;11, 22 girls), 35 four-year-
olds (M = 4;5, range = 4;0-4;11, 18 girls) and 36 five-year-olds (M =5;5, range 
= 5;0-5;11, 12 girls). Although demographics were not formally collected, the 
majority of these children were from white middle class families. This 
demographic information is true for all subsequent experiments. 
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 Materials and Procedure. Children in each age group were randomly 
assigned to either of two conditions, “acceptability” or “knowledge”. All 
children completed two test trials. In each trial, children were shown a picture 
depicting a character and two objects (a character with two backpacks in trial 
one, and a different character with two robot toys in trial two; see Figure 9 for a 
sample picture). Children in the acceptability condition were told that it was 
acceptable for the character to use one of the objects but not the other, and were 
then asked to explain why it was acceptable for the character to use the object 
(e.g., “Why is it okay for the girl to open just this backpack?”). Children in the 
knowledge condition were told instead that the character knew how to use one 
of the objects but not the other, and were asked to explain this (e.g., “Why does 
the girl know how to open just this backpack?) (See Figure 9 for script and 
sample materials). 
 When children did not produce an explanation, or said “I don’t know” 
they were prompted up to three times. First, they were asked to “just guess,” 
and then they were asked “what do you think?”, and finally, if they still did not 
produce an explanation, the original “why” question was repeated. If an 
explanation was still not produced after three prompts, the experimenter moved 
on to the next trial. Children were also prompted if they just repeated the 
information in the test question (e.g., “She can open this one but not this one” 
or “She can open this one”). When this happened children were told “that’s 
right” and then were asked “but, why?”. Children repeating the test question 
information were only prompted once in this way; if they persisted, this answer 
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was accepted. This prompting procedure was used for all subsequent 
experiments.  
 
 
Figure 9. Sample scripts and materials used for all experiments. 
 
 Transcription and Coding. All testing sessions were audio recorded 
onto a laptop and then transcribed by a research assistant. Children’s answers to 
the why questions were then separated from the rest of the transcript, and 
randomly sorted, so that they could no longer be associated with their condition. 
Next, children’s answers were coded. Each response was coded first as 
informative or uninformative. Responses were only considered uninformative if 
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the child produced an answer that was unrelated to the task (e.g., “I have lots of 
backpacks at home”) or if the child indicated they did not know the answer 
(e.g., “I don’t know” or “I can’t think of anything”). Informative explanations 
were then coded as one of four mutually exclusive explanation types: 
ownership, object property, normative4, and other. See Table 2 for a description 
of each category. Children’s explanations never fell into more than one 
category and their entire responses was always coded. 
 
Category Criteria Examples 
Uninformative Any utterance which was not 
comprehensible. This category also 
includes silences and “I don’t know.” 
“Dog.” 
“I don’t know.” 
“I only have one 
backpack.” 
Ownership Explanations referencing someone’s 
ownership or the absence of their 
ownership. This also includes 
referencing ownership-based rules 
about purchasing objects or 
permission. 
“It is the girl’s.”  
“It’s someone else’s.” 
“He paid for it.” 
Object 
Properties 
Explanations referencing features or 
properties of the object such as its 
shape, size, or function. This includes 
non-obvious properties such as safety 
and remote operation. 
“It’s blue.” 
“It’s for wearing.” 
“It has a remote.” 
Normative Explanations referencing non-
ownership rules or conventions in 
some way. This includes references to 
authority, stereotypes, and location-
based rules. 
“It’s a school rule.” 
“It’s a boy one.” 
“It’s always like that.” 
Other All other explanations. “He wanted to.” 
“It is sunny outside.” 
“It’s nice.” 
Table 2. Criteria for all coded categories. 
 
                                                          
4 This category refers to normative considerations other than ownership.  
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 Two coders coded all explanations independently. The inter-coder-
reliability reached near perfect levels (κ = 0.91). All disagreements were 
resolved by discussion.  
Results and Discussion 
 We first examined whether the type of explanations children used was 
affected by condition and age (see Table 3 for children’s mean use of each 
explanation types). To do this, we ran a mixed ANOVA. We treated 
explanation type as a within subjects factor with five levels (each level 
corresponding to an explanation type; see Table 3). Condition and age were 
inputted as between subject factors. This analysis allowed us to explore possible 
effects of condition and age on children’s average use of each explanation type. 
The maximum number of times each explanation type could occur was two. 
(For recent examples of similar analyses see Legare & Lombrozo, 2014; 
Lombrozo & Gwynne, 2014; Rhodes, 2014). Mauchley’s Test of Sphericity 
was significant, so a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used.  
 Explanation type interacted with condition, F(4,320.94) = 6.89, MSE = 
201.67, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.064, and age, F(8, 320.94) = 7.74, p < .001, ŋp2 = 
0.086. Explanation type, age and condition also marginally interacted, F(8, 
320.94) = 1.83, p = .088, ŋp2 = 0.035. Given our interest in ownership, we then 
used a Univariate ANOVA to examine how average use of ownership differed 
by condition and age. There was a main effect of condition, acceptability > 
knowledge, F(1,101) = 17.05, p < .001, ŋp2 = 0.14, and age, older > younger, 
F(2,101) = 4.45, p = .014, ŋp2 = 0.08. Condition and age did not interact, 
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F(2,101) = 1.21, p = .303, ŋp2 = 0.023. Together, these findings show that 
children used different explanation types to explain acceptability and 
knowledge, and that as children age they are more likely to use ownership to 
explain acceptability. 
Age Explanation type Acceptability Knowledge 
3  ownership 0.28 (0.67) 0.00 (0.00) 
  object properties 0.67 (0.84) 0.67 (0.84) 
  norms 0.28 (0.57) 0.22 (0.55) 
  other 0.06 (0.24) 0.28 (0.57) 
4  ownership 0.78 (0.94) 0.18 (0.53) 
  object properties 0.67 (0.84) 0.76 (0.90) 
  norms 0.06 (0.24) 0.00 (0.00) 
  other 0.22 (0.55) 0.76 (0.83) 
5  ownership 1.00 (0.97) 0.22 (0.55) 
  object properties 0.50 (0.62) 1.44 (0.70) 
  norms 0.22 (0.43) 0.00 (0.00) 
  other 0.22 (0.43) 0.28 (0.46) 
Table 3.  Experiment 1: Children’s average use of each explanation type shown 
by condition and age (standard deviation in brackets). 
 
 Because we were particularly interested in children’s ability to explain 
acceptability, our next set of analyses focused on the acceptability condition. 
These analyses used a series of 2 by 2 Chi-Square tests to determine which 
informative explanation type was most frequently used at each age. To decrease 
the number of comparisons and reduce the chances of a Type 1 error, we 
focused our comparisons on the two (or three when most frequent tied) most 
frequently used explanation types at each age. For 3-year-olds the most 
frequently used explanation types were object properties (33%), norms (14%), 
and ownership (14%); this comparison included three categories because of the 
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exact tie between norms and ownership. Object properties occurred marginally 
more often than norms and ownership, both χ2s = 3.77, ps = .052. For 4-year-
olds the most frequently used types were ownership (39%), and object 
properties (33%). Object properties and ownership occurred equally often, χ2 = 
0.24, p = .62. For 5-year-olds, the most frequently used types were ownership 
(50%) and object properties (25%). Ownership occurred significantly more 
often than object properties, χ2 = 4.80, p = .028. These findings show that as 
children aged, they were more likely to provide ownership explanations more 
often than other types of explanations.  
Experiment 2 
 In our first experiment, children became increasingly likely to use 
ownership to explain acceptability with age. Some research suggests that young 
children are very sensitive to how ownership governs what should not be done 
(see Hay & Ross, 1982; Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014a). As such, it is 
possible that young children might be more likely to use ownership to explain 
why it is unacceptable for someone to use an object, than why it might be 
acceptable to use an object. To test this possibility, the present experiment 
compared children’s explanations of acceptability and unacceptability. We also 
asked children to explain a wider range of object uses, and added a screening 
task. 
Method 
 Participants. One-hundred and eight children were tested. These 
included 36 three-year-olds (M = 3;6, range = 3;0-3;11, 23 girls), 36 four-year-
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olds (M = 4;6, range = 4;0-4;11, 18 girls) and 36 five-year-olds (M =5;5, range 
= 5;0-5;11, 18 girls). An additional 8 children were tested but were replaced 
because they failed the screening task.  
 Materials and Procedure. Before the main experiment all children 
participated in a screening task. In this task, they were shown a picture of a girl 
using an umbrella in the pouring rain, and were asked to explain why the girl 
was using the umbrella. Children were given two opportunities to answer the 
question. Children only failed if they did not provide a relevant answer (e.g., “a 
dog”). A screening task was added to this experiment to eliminate children who 
could not generate explanations and who were likely not to speak during the 
main task.  
 After the screening task, children in each age group were randomly 
assigned to either of two conditions: “acceptability” or “unacceptability”. Each 
condition included two trials—a “hat” trial and a “book” trial. These trials were 
always administered in this order but in either of two versions.  
In the acceptability condition, children were told that it was okay for 
one character to wear a particular hat and for another character to take a 
particular book home (version 1), or that it was okay for the first character to 
take a hat home and for the second character to read a particular book (version 
2). The trials in the unacceptability condition were identical, except children 
were told that it was not okay for each character to perform the actions. After 
each trial, children were asked why it was okay (acceptability condition) or not 
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okay (unacceptability condition) for the character to engage in the actions (e.g., 
“Why is it okay for him to wear the hat?”; see Figure 9 for a sample script). 
 Transcription and Coding. The same transcription and coding 
procedures were used as Experiment 1. Two coders coded all explanations 
independently into the categories described in Experiment 1. The inter-coder-
reliability reached near perfect levels (κ = 0.84). All disagreements were 
resolved by discussion. Identical to Experiment 1, Children’s explanations 
never fell into more than one category and their entire responses was always 
coded. 
Results and Discussion 
 The same set of analyses was used as Experiment 1. First, a mixed 
ANOVA was used to determine if the number of explanations from each type 
varied by condition and age (see Table 4 for children’s mean use of each 
explanation types). Again, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant so a 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used. Explanation type interacted with age, 
F(8, 307.68) = 3.81, p = .001, ŋp2 = .070. Explanation type did not interact with 
condition, F(4, 307.68) = 2.31, p = .875. Explanation type, age and condition 
also did not interact, F(8, 307.68) = .68, p = .663. Because of our interest in 
ownership, we then used a Univariate ANOVA to examine children’s average 
use of ownership. There was a main effect of age on children’s use of 
ownership, older > younger, F(2,102) = 5.34, p = .006, ŋp2 = .095. There was no 
main effect of condition on children’s use of ownership, F(1,102) = .064, p = 
.801, and no age by condition interaction, F(2, 102) = .50, p = .610. These 
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findings replicate major findings from Experiment 1, and show that as children 
age they are more likely to use ownership to explain both unacceptability and 
acceptability. 
Age Explanation type Acceptability Unacceptability 
3  ownership 0.39 (0.70) 0.22 (0.55) 
  object properties 0.33 (0.59) 0.06 (0.24) 
  norms 0.11 (0.32) 0.22 (0.55) 
  other 0.78 (0.73) 0.94 (0.94) 
4  ownership 0.56 (0.70) 0.72 (0.75) 
  object properties 0.33 (0.49) 0.39 (0.61) 
  norms 0.28 (0.46) 0.39 (0.61) 
  other 0.78 (0.55) 0.50 (0.62) 
5  ownership 0.83 (0.86) 0.94 (0.94) 
  object properties 0.11 (0.32) 0.06 (0.24) 
  norms 0.39 (0.61) 0.28 (0.46) 
  other 0.67 (0.84) 0.67 (0.77) 
Table 4. Experiment 2: Children’s average use of each explanation type shown 
by condition and age (standard deviation in brackets). 
 
 As in Experiment 1, our second set of analyses examined frequency of 
each explanation type. We collapsed these analyses by condition, because of its 
null effect. For 3-year-olds, the most frequently used explanation types were 
other (43%) and ownership (15%). We found that 3-year-olds used other more 
often than ownership, χ2 = 13.45, p < .001. For 4-year-olds, the most frequently 
used ownership (32%), other (32%) and object properties (13%); this 
comparison included three categories because of the exact tie between other and 
ownership. Ownership and other were used marginally more often than object 
properties, χ2 = 3.70, p = .054.For 5-year-olds, the most frequently used types 
were ownership (44%) and other (33%). Ownership and other occurred equally 
 83 
 
often, χ2 = 1.87, p = .17. Although the other category tied with ownership for 4- 
and 5-year-olds, this category is heterogeneous and does not reflect a single or 
dominant type of explanation. So for the older children, ownership was the 
dominant principle used to explain acceptability. The general pattern again 
emerged that as children aged, they were more likely to provide ownership 
explanations.  
Experiment 3 
 In the previous experiments, children’s use of ownership as an 
explanation increased with age. One possible reason is that younger children 
may find it difficult to infer that ownership is relevant. Therefore in Experiment 
3 we provided children with information about ownership so they did not have 
to infer that it was relevant. We also provided information about object 
properties, so that children could choose whether this factor or ownership was 
more relevant. Object properties were chosen because 3-year-olds and 4-year-
olds frequently referred to these in Experiment 1 and 2. Although “other” 
sometimes occurred more often, it could not be used in our comparison because 
of its heterogeneous nature. We again included acceptability and 
unacceptability conditions, because we expected younger children’s references 
to ownership to increase and thus a possible condition differences to emerge. 
Method 
 Participants. We tested 108 children. These included 36 3-year-olds (M 
= 3;5, range= 3;0–3;11, girls = 15), 36 4-year-olds (M = 4;5, range= 4;0–4;11, 
girls = 15) and 36 5-year-olds (M = 5;7, range = 5;1–5;11, girls = 15). One 
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additional child was tested; however they were not included in our analysis 
because they failed a screening task. This screening task was the same as 
Experiment 2. 
 Materials and Procedure. Children in each age group were randomly 
assigned to either an acceptability or unacceptability condition, each of which 
consisted of two test trials. In each trial in the acceptability condition, children 
were shown a picture of a character next to an object (hat in trial 1, book in trial 
2). They were then told two pieces of information, one about a property of the 
object (e.g., “It’s the right size for him” or “It’s easy to read”) and the other 
about ownership (e.g., “It’s the man’s hat”); order counterbalanced across 
participants. Children were then told that it was acceptable for the character to 
use the object, and were then asked the test question (e.g., “Why is it okay for 
him to wear it?); see Figure 9 for sample script and pictures. 
 The unacceptability condition was identical except for the information 
provided to the children before the test question was adjusted for the action 
being “not okay”. In this condition, children were told a negative object 
property (e.g., “It’s too big for him” or “It’s hard to read”) and that the object 
did not belong to the character (e.g., “It’s someone else’s”).  
 Transcription and Coding. Because children in this experiment were 
given information about ownership and object properties, their informative 
explanations were coded based on whether they referred to ownership, object 
properties, or neither of these factors. Uninformative responses (e.g., “I don’t 
know”) were coded into an uninformative category. Six of the 108 children 
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tested provided both explanation types, and were given credit in each category. 
The coders had substantial agreement (κ = 0.72 to 0.94). (Because categories 
were not mutually exclusive, Cohen’s Kappa for each category was calculated). 
All disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results and Discussion 
 Similar to the Experiment 1 and 2 a mixed ANOVA was used to 
determine if explanation type varied by condition and age (see Figure 10 for 
children’s mean use of each explanation types). For these analyses we only 
examined the informative explanation types of ownership, object properties, 
and neither. Explanation type interacted with condition, F(2, 204) = 3.37, p = 
.036, ŋp2  = .032, and marginally interacted with age, F(4, 204) = 2.37, p = 
0.054, ŋp2 = .044. However, condition, age, and explanation type did not interact 
F(4, 204) = 1.16, p = .332. Given our specific interest in ownership, we then ran 
a Univariate ANOVA to confirm the effects of condition on average use of 
ownership as an explanation. There was a main effect of condition on children’s 
use of ownership, unacceptability > acceptability, F(1,102) = 5.45, p = .022, ŋp2 
= 0.051, and age, older > younger, F(2, 102) = 5.57, p = .005, ŋp2 = 0.098. 
Condition and age did not interact, F(2, 102) = .83, p = .439. These findings 
replicate major findings from Experiment 1 and 2. Overall, as children age they 
were more likely to use ownership as an explanation. In contrast to Experiment 
2, children offered more ownership explanations when explaining 
unacceptability than when explaining acceptability. Overall, this suggests that 
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when prompted, young children view ownership as more relevant for 
explaining unacceptability. 
 
Figure 10. Experiment 3: Children’s average use of each explanation type 
shown by condition and age; error bars show ± standard error. 
 
 Similar to Experiment 1 and 2 we then examined frequency of each type 
of explanation at each age. We conducted separate frequency analyses for each 
condition, because of its significant main effect on the types of explanations 
children offered. We first examined the acceptability condition. For 3-year-olds 
the most frequently used type of explanations were neither (47%) and object 
properties (25%). Neither was used significantly more often than object 
properties, χ2 = 3.89, p = .050. For 4-year-olds, the most frequently used types 
of explanations were also neither (44%) and object properties (31%). These did 
not significantly differ from each other, χ2 = 1.45, p = .22. For 5-year-olds, the 
most frequently used types of explanations were ownership (53%) and object 
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properties (28%). Ownership was used significantly more often than object 
properties, χ2 = 4.68, p = .031. These findings show that when explaining 
acceptability older children, but not younger children, provide ownership as an 
explanation more often than other types of explanations. 
 We next examined the unacceptability condition. For 3-year-olds the 
most frequently used types of explanations were ownership (39%) and object 
properties (39%) and they were used equally often. For 4-year-olds the most 
frequent types were ownership (44%) and again object properties (25%). 
Ownership occurred marginally more often than object properties, χ2 = 3.00, p 
= .083. For 5-year-olds, ownership (58%) and neither (31%) were most 
common. Ownership occurred significantly more often than neither, χ2 = 5.63, p 
= .018. Overall, we found that when explaining unacceptability, ownership was 
a prominent explanation type at all ages (i.e., either tied for most frequent or 
most frequent).  
General Discussion 
 We used 3- to 5-year-olds’ explanations to investigate the influence of 
ownership in their reasoning about the acceptability of using objects. Together 
our findings suggest that ownership is influential in young children’s reasoning 
about the acceptability of using objects and its influence increases with age. 
Ownership only influenced younger preschoolers reasoning about acceptability 
in limited cases (i.e., when they reasoned about unacceptability after ownership 
had been mentioned).  
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These age-related changes reflect development in children’s conceptual 
reasoning not linguistic ability. Three-year-olds were able to meet the linguistic 
demands of our task and provided many coherent explanations—they were just 
not about ownership. Out of the 90 3-year-olds asked to explain acceptability, 
73 (81%) provided informative explanations. Moreover, in Experiment 3, 
linguistic demands cannot explain the difference in 3-year-olds’ use of 
ownership between conditions (unacceptability > acceptability) as both 
conditions had the same linguistic demands. Below we relate our findings to 
our two major questions, and also discuss the broader implications of our 
findings for the study of children’s explanations.  
The Relevance of Ownership 
 In daily life, children encounter many situations where ownership is not 
mentioned to them, but they must infer its relevance. However, this is the first 
study to examine whether children can infer ownership’s relevance in cases 
where it has not been mentioned in any way. In Experiment 1 and 2, children 
were not told who owned the object, thus any mention of ownership in their 
explanations was spontaneous. As preschoolers aged they were more likely to 
infer that ownership was relevant. Five-year-olds provided the most ownership 
explanations (44% to 50%), and 3-year-olds the least (14% to 15%). These 
findings suggest that younger preschoolers struggle to recognize ownership’s 
relevance for reasoning about acceptability. Findings from Experiment 3 
confirmed this. In Experiment 3, children were provided with information about 
ownership (e.g., “It’s someone else’s hat”), and so they did not need to infer its 
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relevance. On average this manipulation doubled ownership references in 3- 
and 4-year-olds.  
 One reason why this inference might have been difficult for young 
preschoolers is that such inferences make executive demands. Generating 
explanations which depend on non-obvious property likely requires executive 
control of memory (i.e., to actively search semantic memory for relevant 
information about the kinds of events that can cause an outcome; e.g., Tomita, 
Ohbayashi, Nakahara, Hasegawa, & Miyashita, 1999).  Immature executive 
functioning and thus executive control of memory might explain why younger 
preschoolers provided explanations which depended on more obvious and 
available properties (i.e., because these explanations are less generative and 
depend less on executive functioning).  
Privileging Ownership 
 Many considerations beyond ownership influence the acceptability of 
using an object such as its properties, testimony from authority, and stereotypes. 
We investigated whether children privilege ownership over other considerations 
by examining whether they reference ownership more often than other 
considerations in their explanations. In 3-year-olds, ownership explanations 
typically occurred less than often other types of explanations, such as object 
properties, and in 4-year-olds ownership explanations typically tied as the most 
commonly used category with other types of explanations. Not until 5-years-old 
was ownership typically the most dominant explanation type. These findings 
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show that with age children are more likely to privilege ownership over other 
considerations when reasoning about acceptability.  
Some of our findings suggest an asymmetry in the influence of 
ownership on 3- and 4-year-olds’ reasoning about acceptability and 
unacceptability. In Experiment 3, ownership shifted from being a non-dominant 
explanation type in the Acceptability condition to a highly dominant one in the 
Unacceptability condition for younger preschoolers. (We did not find this 
difference in Experiment 2, most likely because ownership explanations 
occurred too infrequently in younger children to capture it.) This difference in 
younger preschoolers might reflect an increased sensitive to the ways non-
owners are excluded from using property (i.e., the Right of Exclusion) (see Hay 
& Ross, 1982; Nancekivell & Friedman, 2014a).  
One limitation of our measure of privilege should be acknowledged. 
Specifically, we only used scenarios where characters used common objects in 
harmless or benign ways. We chose these scenarios (e.g., a man wearing a hat 
or taking it home) because they are characteristic of everyday situations. 
However, these scenarios may have lent themselves more to ownership than 
other types of normative explanations (e.g., gender stereotypes). For example, 
children might have referred to gender norms more if we had used gendered 
objects (e.g., dresses and trucks). Moreover, it is unknown if same pattern of 
findings would emerge if children were asked about other actions (e.g., 
modifying or sharing objects). Future research should investigate these 
possibilities. 
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Broader Implications for Children’s Explanations 
Our findings also have two important implications for the study of 
explanations. First, we extend existing knowledge regarding the kinds of non-
obvious properties children use to explain events. Previous research has shown 
that young children generate explanations using non-obvious properties such as 
illness, bodily functions, mental states, and social norms (e.g., Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1989; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009; Miller & Bartsch, 1997; 
Rhodes, 2014; Wellman & Lagattuta, 2004). Our findings are the first to 
demonstrate that ownership is also part of young children’s explanatory 
framework. Second, our findings show that mentioning non-obvious properties 
directly affects the degree to which 3-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, refer to 
such properties in their explanations. In many studies showing that 3-year-olds 
reference non-obvious properties in their explanations, the non-obvious 
property that researchers intended 3-year-olds to mention was alluded to in the 
preceding vignette or question (see Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Lagattuta & 
Wellman, 2001). Our findings suggest that these studies may have found 
different results if they had not first provided children with this kind of 
information. Our findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between 
the kinds of explanations young children naturally produce or produce with 
little supporting information, and the kinds of explanations young children 
might produce with more supporting information.
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Chapter Five: General Conclusions 
Major Findings  
Paper one investigated preschoolers’ understanding of how people 
become owners. In two experiments, children were asked to explain why a 
character owns an object. Four- and five-year-olds frequently used past 
acquisition of an object to explain ownership but rarely to explain preference or 
use. Their discussion of past acquisition indicates that they understand that 
ownership results from past investment upon an object, and other person–object 
relations (e.g., liking, use) do not. Four- and five-year-olds also showed an 
appreciation that different kinds of objects are typically acquired in particular 
ways. For example, 4- and 5-year-olds said that the rock was found, the picture 
was made, and the hat was bought. Because 4- and 5-year-olds were never told 
how these objects were acquired, they had to infer this information for 
themselves. These findings are also the first to show that by four years of age 
children have a robust ability to infer unseen past events or history in their 
explanations.  
Paper two investigated preschoolers’ understanding of what ownership 
affords. Four- to six-year-olds were asked to generate lists of what a character 
was allowed to do with an object she either owned or did not own. In 
Experiment 1, 4- and 6-year-olds provided longer lists with more extreme uses 
when discussing possible uses of personally-owned property than when 
discussing possible uses of others’ property. They were also more likely to 
spontaneously list restrictions when discussing the use of others’ property than 
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when discussing the use of personal owned property. These findings show that 
by age four, children appreciate that people can use their own property freely 
but are restricted in using others’ property. Experiment 2 replicated these 
findings and also investigated children’s reasoning about ownerless objects.  In 
this experiment, children granted similar levels of entitlement to those using 
ownerless objects and personally-owned objects, and lower levels of 
entitlement to those using other-owned objects. These findings suggest that 
children do not view entitlement to use objects as unique to ownership. 
Together the findings from both experiments suggest that children may possibly 
be reasoning about ownership using a restriction-based principle.  
Paper Three investigated when ownership influences preschoolers’ 
reasoning about the acceptability of using objects. In three experiments, young 
children were asked to explain either why it was acceptable or unacceptable to 
use an object. In Experiment 1 and 2 ownership was never mentioned and 
preschoolers had to infer its relevance for themselves. In these two experiments, 
5-year-olds provided the most ownership explanations and 3-year-olds the 
fewest. In Experiment 3, ownership was highlighted to children as a possible 
explanation. Although 5-year-olds still produced the most ownership 
explanations, younger preschoolers’ references to ownership increased. A 
difference between conditions also emerged: Younger preschoolers referenced 
ownership more when explaining unacceptability than when explaining 
acceptability. Together, these findings suggest that the influence of ownership 
increases with age. Ownership only influenced younger preschoolers reasoning 
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about acceptability in limited cases (i.e., when they reasoned about 
unacceptability after ownership had been mentioned).   
Intersections Between Papers 
 The findings of my three papers intersect in a few ways. These 
intersections suggest some general conclusions about children’s understanding 
of ownership and about the early production of explanations. 
Intersection 1: Development in Explanation. The first intersection lies 
between the developmental trends found in Paper one and three. In Paper one, 
3-year-olds, but not 4- and 5-year-olds, rarely used history to explain 
ownership. In Paper three, 3-year-olds, unlike older children, rarely used 
ownership to explain acceptability. In both cases, 3-year-olds relied on readily 
available and obvious properties of objects in their explanations (e.g., colour or 
size) instead of the non-obvious factor older children relied on (i.e., history and 
ownership). In these papers, I suggest that 3-year-olds’ difficulty likely stems 
from immature executive control of memory: 3-year-olds offered obvious 
properties instead of non-obvious ones because they could not effectively 
search their semantic memory for a better answer (Garon, Bryson, & 
Smith, 2008; Tomita, Ohbayashi, Nakahara, Hasegawa, & Miyashita, 1999).  
Alternatively, 3-year-olds’ difficulty could be specific to ownership. My 
first study (Paper one, liking condition) demonstrated that 3-year-olds can 
generate explanations by referencing at least one non-obvious property: desires. 
Such explanations suggest that 3-year-olds might not have difficulty referring to 
other non-obvious properties in their explanations. However, desire-based 
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explanations may be easier to generate than other kinds of non-obvious 
explanations. There is a large literature suggesting that preferences and desires 
are particularly salient to young children (e.g., Bartsch, & Wellman, 1989; 
Kushnir, Gopnik, Chernyak, Seiver, & Wellman, 2015; Wellman, & Woolley, 
1990). For example, it is not until 6-years-old that children will say that people 
can choose to act against their desires (Kushnir et al., 2015). The salience of 
desires might make generating desire-based explanations less demanding. This 
might make explanations referring to desires the exception (i.e., and not 
explanations referring to ownership). Future research should have children 
generate explanations using other kinds of non-obvious properties to see how 
far their difficulty extends. 
Intersection 2: Children View Restriction as Important. A second 
intersection exists between my findings in Paper two and three. In these papers, 
I found that children appear to be particularly sensitive to the restrictive or 
exclusionary nature of ownership. In Paper two, I found that children often 
spontaneously discussed how ownership restricts the use of others’ property, 
and proposed that a broad restriction-based principle likely underlies their 
understanding of ownership rights. Likewise in Paper three, Experiment 3, I 
found that 3-year-olds used ownership more often to explain unacceptability 
(i.e., which restricts the use of property) than acceptability (i.e., which permits 
the use of property). Together, these finding suggest that ownership’s restrictive 
or exclusionary nature is very salient to young children.   
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There are two possibilities regarding why ownership’s restrictive nature 
may be especially salient. One possibility is that it is especially salient because 
restriction is an integral part of ownership. Many theorists have suggested that 
exclusion or the Right of Exclusion is necessary for ownership (Cohen, 1954; 
Merrill, 1998). Under this account, young children are sensitive to ownership’s 
exclusionary and restrictive nature because they recognize its importance. 
Notably, children’s recognition of the importance of exclusion is also suggested 
by their ability to use exclusion to infer who owns an object (Neary, Friedman, 
& Burnstein, 2009).  
An alternative possibility is that children’s sensitivity is a by-product of 
a more general and early developing sensitivity to the inference of goals 
(Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2010; Kuhlmeier, 2013; Woodward, 
2009). Previous research has shown that 3-month-old infants can detect when 
one agent interferes with another’s goals (Hamlin, Wynn & Bloom, 2010). 
Under this account, ownership’s restrictive nature is especially salient to young 
children because it often manifests as goal interference. For example, imagine 
Bart wants to play basketball, but Sally owns the only basketball nearby and 
will not let him use it. Sally’s act of exclusion is actively preventing or 
interfering with Bart’s goal to play basketball.  
Intersection 3: A Theory of Ownership?  The final intersection among 
my findings spans all three of my papers. Developmental psychologists have 
long been interested in whether children’s knowledge is theory-like or contains 
abstract coherent systems of causal entities and rules (Carey, 1985; Gelman & 
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Noles, 2011; Gopnik, 2003; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). One important feature 
of theories is that they have ontological commitments (Gelman, & Noles, 2011; 
Gopnik, 2003). Ontological commitments are typically unobservable entities 
that participate in a theory (Gelman & Noles, 2011). For example, the 
ontological commitments of folk psychology are thoughts and desires (Gelman, 
& Noles, 2011). Similarly, the ontological commitments of ownership are 
property and owners. Previous research has shown that young children can infer 
which objects are owned and who owns them, and thus that they can identify 
ownership’s ontological commitments (e.g., Friedman & Neary, 2008; Neary, 
Friedman, & Burnstein, 2009; Neary, Van de Vondervoort, & Friedman, 2012; 
Van de Vandervoort, & Friedman, 2015).  
 However, another important feature of theories is that they support 
causal-explanatory reasoning (Gelman, & Noles, 2011; Gopnik, 2003). This 
means that theories must be able to explain and predict outcomes. For example, 
children’s theories of physics are causal-explanatory because principles of 
physics like gravity can be used to explain events like a ball falling off a shelf 
(Gelman, & Noles, 2011). My findings are the first to show that children’s 
reasoning about ownership is causal-explanatory. My third paper shows that 
children use ownership to explain the acceptability of using objects. For 
example, it shows that older preschoolers use ownership to explain why it is 
okay to open a backpack or wear a hat. My second paper shows that children 
also use information about who owns an object to judge or predict what is 
acceptable. Together, these findings suggest that children understand the causal 
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relations between acceptability and ownership. My first paper also shows that 
young children understand what kinds of events cause a person to own an 
object.  
My findings combined with previous work suggest that children’s 
understanding of ownership may be theory-like. However, one limitation of my 
research is that it focused on the causal relations between acceptability and 
ownership.  It would be important for future research to show that ownership 
also supports young children’s causal-explanatory reasoning of behaviour. For 
example, it could investigate whether preschoolers use ownership to explain 
events like why someone is sitting on a particular chair, or is driving a 
particular car. If children use ownership as an explanation it would suggest that 
ownership broadly influences their causal-explanatory reasoning.  
Universality of Ownership Reasoning 
My dissertation is informative about the reasoning about ownership of 
children in Canada. However, whether my findings are culturally universal is 
unclear. 
Some aspects of how children reason about ownership differ cross-
culturally. Three-year-olds in America and China are more likely than three-
year-olds in Brazil and Vanuatu to use information about creation and 
familiarity to judge who owns property (Rochat, Robbins, Passos-Ferreira, 
Dias, & Guo, 2014). British and Japanese 4-year-olds are more likely than 
Chinese 4-year-olds to consider creative labour when attributing ownership to 
social agents (i.e., robots) (Kanngiesser, Itakuram, Zhou, Kanda, Ishiguro, & 
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Hood, 2015).  Finally, unlike Western children, Kenyan children from small 
scale groups do not use first possession of an object to decide who owns an 
object until 8-years-old (Kanngiesser, Rossano, & Tomasello, 2015).  
Whether children’s reasoning about the role of investment (Paper one) 
and exclusion (Paper two and three) for ownership is also affected by their 
culture is an important consideration for future research. It seems likely that 
children’s reasoning about investment (Paper one) and exclusion (Paper two 
and three) are not affected by culture. These principles appear to be 
fundamental to ownership. For example, it is unclear what would cause 
ownership in another culture if investment did not, and how ownership would 
operate if it did not, in some way, exclude others. Although previous findings 
show that cultural differences exist in the heuristics children use to assign 
ownership, children still cross-culturally recognize ownership and at very 
young ages. This suggests that some fundamental aspects of ownership are 
likely universal. Nonetheless, these are open questions, and future research will 
be needed to provide definitive answers. Even if these factors are universal, 
they might show some cultural variation. For instance, even if all cultures view 
non-owners as typically excluded from others’ property, cultures might differ in 
who is typically excluded. For example, although universally strangers may be 
excluded from using each others’ property, relatives and family may not be 
universally excluded.  It is well-known that there are many cross-cultural 
differences in how kinship is conceptualized (Sahlins, 2011), and it is possible 
that these differences could influence ownership relations. 
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Conclusion 
Together, my papers show that by around 4-years-old preschoolers 
begin to effectively reason about the “how”, “what” and “when” of ownership. 
These papers also raise questions for future research, and demonstrate the 
significance of open-ended measures for the study of developmental 
psychology.
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